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Architectural Level Risk Assessment 
 
Ahmed E. Hassan 
 
Many companies develop and maintain different types of large-scale software 
systems for public and financial institutions. Should a failure occur in one of these 
systems, the impact would be enormous. It is therefore essential, in maintaining a 
system’s quality, to identify any defects early on in the development process in order to 
prevent the occurrence of failures. However, testing all modules of large-scale systems to 
identify defects can be very expensive. There is therefore a need for methodologies and 
tools that support software engineers in identifying the defected and complex software 
components early on in the development process. Accurate early estimates will help 
reduce wasted resources associated with testing.  
Risk assessment is an essential process for ensuring high quality software products. 
By performing risk assessment during the early software development phases we can 
identify complex and high risk software modules, thus enables us to enhance resource 
allocation decisions. 
To assess the risk of software systems early on in the software’s life cycle, we 
propose an architectural level risk assessment methodology. It combines the probability 
of software failures and the severity associated with these failures to estimate software 
risk factors. As a result, remedial actions to control and improve the quality of the 
 
 
software product can be taken.  We use UML specifications of software systems, which 
are available early on in the software life cycle to come up with the risk factors of 
software architectural elements (components/connectors), the scenarios, the use cases and 
systems. Based on this methodology we build a risk assessment model which will enable 
us to identify complex and noncomplex software components. We will be able to 
estimate programming and service effort, and estimate testing effort. This model will 
enable us also to identify components with high risk factor which would require the 
development of effective fault tolerant mechanisms.  
To estimate the probability of software failure we introduced and developed 
dynamic metrics which are used to measure dynamic complexity and dynamic coupling 
for software architectural elements from UML static models.  
To estimate severity of software failure we propose an architectural level severity 
methodology early on in the software design phase based on UML artifacts. Also we 
propose a validation process for both risk and severity methodologies. Finally we propose 
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Introduction and Background 
 
 
This section introduces the research motivation and presents an overview of the 
general problem area. It describes the significance of the research and gives an overview 
of the research including the scope and limitations. Background information follows to 
establish fundamental concepts. 
1.1 Motivation 
All software projects are exposed to some degree of risk. The process of 
developing a software solution based on plans and schedules containing estimates, 
assumptions and other uncertainties are a risky business. This risk arises from software 
project [Heemstra, 2003], software process [Brockers, 1995] or software product 
[Katerina, 2003]. The software product risk is the risk of failure of software product. Our 
research focus in this dissertation is software product risk assessment. 
Many critical systems rely for their correct operation on complicated software 
systems [Knight, 2000]. The impact of failure of these systems is huge. It is therefore very 
important to identify any defects in these software systems in advance to reduce the 
occurrence of failures. However, testing all modules in these types of large-scale systems to 
identify defects is very expensive.  
Accurate early estimates can help reduce wasted resources associated with testing. 
Elemam et al [Elemam, 1999f] suggests that most field faults in software are found in a 
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small proportion of the software components. Also Fenton et al [Fenton, 1999f] found very 
strong indications that a small number of software components contain most of the faults 
discovered during the testing phase, and that a very small number of components contain 
most of the faults discovered in operation. This means that if these faulty components can 
be detected early on in the software life cycle development, rectifying actions can be taken. 
If we can identify complex and critical software components in advance, we can focus on 
the components that need intensive testing and hence detect defects more efficiently.  
Risk assessment is an essential process in managing and controlling software 
development process.  Risk assessment at the early design phase of the software is more 
feasible and more beneficial than assessment at later development phases. Architecture 
level risk assessment can be used to guide software development, testing, and maintenance 
process.  
The risk assessment at the software design phase will allow for a wide range of 
preventive/corrective actions to be taken with the least impact on budget and schedule. It 
enables designers to backtrack and redesign components with high risk factor. It could 
also be used for assigning technical staff to testing, and maintenance efforts. Rather than 
inspecting all software components on an equal basis, focusing on high risk components 
can improve the efficiency of inspection.  
To estimate risk of a software system we have to find an estimate for the 
probability of software failure and also an estimate for the severity of this failure 
[NASA3, 2000]. Our work is motivated by systemizing the risk assessment process. In 
doing so, we estimate the probability of software failure as a function of software 





1.2 Research Significance 
We have developed a risk assessment methodology to assess the risk of software 
systems based on measurable parameters that can be automatically collected and analyzed 
in the early software design phase based on UML artifacts. 
In summary our contributions include: 
• Introducing an architectural level risk assessment methodology. 
• Introducing and developing UML based dynamic metrics which can be used as a 
measure for probability of software failure. 
• Introducing and developing an architectural level severity assessment technique 
using classical hazard analysis methods and software UML models. 
• Developing a tool support for the automation of the risk methodology. 
1.3 Dissertation Structure 
Chapter 2 presents the research objective of this work. Chapter 3 contains a 
literary survey of related work in areas of software metrics, hazard analysis, severity 
analysis and risk assessment. Chapter 4 addresses the dynamic metrics based on UML 
static models. Chapter 5 presents the risk assessment methodology and risk model for 
component/connector, scenario and use case risk model. Chapter 6 describes the severity 
assessment methodology, Chapter 7 presents case studies, Chapter 8 is the evaluation 
criteria for the risk assessment model, Chapter 9 presents a prototype tool support, and. 






This section contains relevant background information to orient the reader, 
provide a foundation of basic risk concepts, clarify the meaning of software risk 
assessment, and define key terms used in this dissertation.  
 
1.4.1 Risk assessment 
NASA-STD-8719.13A standard [NASA2, 1997]  defines risk as a combination of 
two factors: probability of a malfunction (failure) and the consequence of that 
malfunction (severity). Probability of failure depends on the probability of occurrence of 
a fault combined with the likelihood of exercising that fault. This standard defines several 
types of risks, for example, availability risk, acceptance risk, performance risk, cost risk, 
schedule risk, and reliability based risk. Our interest is the reliability-based risk. The 
reliability-based risk takes into account the probability that the software product will fail 
in the operational environment and the adversity of that failure [Yacoub, 2003].  
1.4.2 Unified Modeling Language (UML) 
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) [OMG, 2000] is a widely accepted 
standard notation for modeling software systems and its use is continuously growing. The 
software development industry is embracing UML language for its various uses, starting 
from requirement analysis, to define software system architecture and also in the 
subsequent phases of software life cycle. UML provides a framework for decomposing 
the problem of software design into smaller components that are related to one another. 
Different UML diagrams are provided (in an integrated framework) to represent the 
software model from different viewpoints. The UML language is supported by graphical 
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representations (easy to use), that are not far from the classical diagrams used before 
introducing UML (e.g., state diagrams, class diagrams, and sequence diagrams. 
Software architecture is defined in terms of components and connectors in UML 
models. 
We will use the generic term component to refer to the unit of observation. This 
may mean a procedure, a file, an object, a method and as elaborate as a package of 
classes or procedures. The proposed methodology is applicable irrespective of the exact 
definition of a component. Connectors can be as simple as procedure calls; they can also 
be as elaborate as client-server protocols, links between distributed databases, or 
middleware. The components are mapped to the various components of the UML 
sequence diagrams and the connectors can be perceived as the medium through which the 
message transfer takes place 
Next section sheds lights on dynamic metrics captured from UML static 
specifications. 
1.4.3 Dynamic Metrics 
Static analysis [Benlarbi, 1999] helps software designers in generating software 
metrics such as class size, the size of the hierarchy and static complexity measures which 
could help in estimating code level defects. The complex dynamic behavior of many 
applications, especially real-time applications, motivates a shift in interest from 
traditional static analysis to dynamic analysis. Dynamic analysis is performed to analyze 
the behavior of objects as expected during run time. UML defines modeling 
specifications that can be used to specify the dynamic aspects of the software 
architecture, which is critical to all development phases. UML is a suitable candidate for 
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the proposed dynamic metrics. These dynamic metrics could automatically capture the 
dynamic (complexity, coupling) of software architecture element components/connectors 
from the UML visual static model.  
The value of software metrics stems from their association with measures of 
important external attributes [Elemam, 1999f]. An external attribute is measured with 
respect to how the product relates to its environment. Examples of external attributes are 
testability, reliability and maintainability. Practitioners, whether they are developers, 
managers, or quality assurance personnel, are concerned with the external attributes. 
However, they cannot measure many of the external attributes directly until quite late in 
the life cycle of a project or even a product itself. Therefore, they can use product metrics 
as leading indicators of those external attributes that are important to them. For instance, 
if we know that a certain coupling metric is a good leading indicator of maintainability, 
as measured in terms of the effort to make a corrective change, then we can minimize 
coupling during design because we know that in doing so, we are also increasing 
maintainability. As explored in chapter 4 we propose dynamic metrics [Hassan, 2001] 
based on UML for measuring dynamic complexity/coupling of software architectural 
elements (i.e. component/connector). We relate these metrics to the probability of 
component/connector failure [Yacoub, 1999]. 
1.4.4 Probability of Failure  
As stated in section 1.4.1, risk is defined as combination of probability of a 
malfunction (failure) and the consequence of that malfunction (severity). 
During the early phases of the software life cycle, it is difficult to estimate the 
probability of failure of software components; therefore we use quantitative factors such 
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as complexity (for components) and coupling (for connectors), which have a major 
impact on fault proneness according to [Elemam11, 1999]. We use dynamic metrics to 
estimate the probability of fault manifesting into a failure. Dynamic metrics are used to 
measure the dynamic behavior of the system in a given scenario based on the premise 
that the active components/connectors are the source of failures [Yacoub3, 1999]. We use 
dynamic metrics as indicators of the probability of failure of a software 
component/connector. 
1.4.5 Severity  
Traditional software fault detection models do not take into account the fact that 
the consequences of various software failures caused by faults can be very different 
[Briand, 1993a]. Thus, they are of limited use in the allocation of resources to the 
portions of a system with the greatest risk. Since software failures have different 
consequences, any measure of software fault proneness must include the measurement of 
the consequence of failure (severity) [El-Emam, 1999]. Traditional software fault 
detection models have not considered the cost of failure [Lanubile, 1997], [Harrison, 
1988], so they are inappropriate for measuring the true risk associated with failure. Since 
software failures have different consequences, [Susan, 1988] any measure of software 
reliability risk must include the measurement of the consequence of failure.  
1.4.6 Hazard Analysis 
Hazard analysis plays a key role in system safety approach. A hazard is “any real 
or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death to personnel, or damage to, 
or loss of, equipment or property, or damage to environment” [DoD, 1997]. Many 
techniques are available to help identify and analyze hazards. The use of multiple hazard 
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analysis techniques is recommended because each has its own purpose, strengths and 
weaknesses. Typically, each technique addresses certain aspects of safety; thus, one 
technique alone is not sufficient to identify and analyze all hazards of a system 
[Sammarco, 2003]. 
1.5 Definitions 
Hazard: Existing or potential condition that can result in or contribute to, a mishap 
[NASA2, 1997]. 
Mishap: An unplanned event or series of events that results in death, injury, occupational 
illness, or damage to or loss of equipment, property, or damage to the environment; an 
accident [NASA2, 1997].  
Risk: As it applies to safety, exposure to the chance of injury or loss. It is a function of 
the possible frequency of occurrence of the undesired event, of the potential severity of 
resulting consequences, and of the uncertainties associated with the frequency and 
severity [NASA2, 1997]. 
Software error: An incorrect step, process, or data definition; for example, an incorrect 
instruction in a computer program. 
Software failure: An event in which a system or system component does not perform a 
required function within specified limits [Sammarco, 2004]. 
Software fault: A manifestation of an error in the software. If encountered, a failure 
might result [Sammarco, 2004]. 
Software architecture: There is no standard, universally-accepted definition of the term, 
“software architecture,” although there is no shortage of definitions, either [Bass, 2003]. 
The software architecture of a program or computing system is the structure or structures 
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of the system, which comprise software elements, the externally visible properties of 
those elements, and the relationships among them.  
Severity: severity considers the worst potential consequence of a failure, determined by 
the degree of injury, property damage, or system damage that could ultimately occur 
[MIL_STD, 1984]. 
Software metrics: metrics are means of measuring some aspect of software and, in most 
organizations, it directly relates to quality [Zuse, 1998]. The IEEE definition is “metric” 
is synonymous with a “software quality metric” and it defines a software quality metric 
as a function with input and output. Software quality metrics have software data as inputs 
and a single numeric value as output. The output is interpreted as the degree to which 
software possesses a given attribute that affects its quality [IEEE, 1993]. 
Software process: Lonchamp [Lonchamp, 1993] defines a software process as “A set of 
partially ordered process steps, with a set of related artifacts, human and computerized 
resources, organizational structures and constraints, intended to produce and maintain 
the requested software deliverables”. 
1.6 Summary 
We presented in this chapter an overview of the general problem area. It describes 
the research significance and gives an overview of the research scope and the limitations. 
Finally, relevant background information has been presented to provide a foundation of 
basic risk assessment concepts, clarify commonly misunderstood relationships, and 
introduce terminology, in order to provide a common understanding. 
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C h a p t e r  2  
Research Objectives and Specific Aims 
 
2.1 Overview 
In order to improve and control the quality of the software during the software 
development process, software engineers and managers need methodologies and tools to 
support software design and decision-making. Early risk assessment based on UML 
models is a helpful tool for managers as well as software engineers. It could be a very 
effective method of improving the system quality and reducing testing costs. 
Several methodologies for risk assessment have been developed, mostly based on 
subjective views. These approaches of risk assessment are highly sensitive to the manager’s 
perceptions and preferences, which are difficult to represent by an algorithm. Depending on 
the decision-maker’s attitude towards risk, he or she can decide early with little 
information, or can postpone the decision, thus gaining time to obtain more information, 
but losing some control. Without a systematic way of assessing possible risk, it is difficult 
to build a high quality cost-effective system [Boehm, 1997]. There is a need for a 
methodology to transform risk assessment into a structured problem with systematic 
solutions. Constructing a model to assess risk based on objectively measurable parameters 
that can be automatically collected and analyzed in the early design phase is our focus in 
this dissertation. 
The traditional software fault detection models do not consider the fact that the 
consequences of various software failures caused by faults will be very different [Briand, 
1993a]. Thus, they are of limited use in the allocation of resources to the portions of a 
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system with the greatest risk. Any measure of software risk must include the 
measurement of the consequence of failure (severity) [El-Emam, 1999] [Susan, 1988]. 
We propose a methodology for estimating the consequence of software failure (severity) 
early on in the software design phase based on UML artifacts.   
2.2 Research Objective 
Our objective is to develop risk assessment methodology based on measurable 
parameters that could automatically be collected and analyzed in the early software 
design phase based on UML artifacts. We have also developed a severity assessment 
methodology based on UML models. 
2.3 Specific Aims 
 Introducing architectural level risk assessment methodology, we should be able to 
transform risk assessment into a structured problem with systematic solutions. 
 Introducing and developing dynamic metrics which are used to measure dynamic 
complexity and dynamic coupling for software architectural element 
(component/connector) from UML static models. 
 Introducing and developing architectural level severity assessment technique 
based on UML models using classical hazard analysis methods. 
 Building risk assessment model which will enable us to : 
• Identify complex software components that need detailed inspection. 
• Identify noncomplex software components that are likely to have a low risk 
factor and therefore candidates for development without detailed inspection. 
• Estimate programming and service effort, and estimate testing effort.  
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• Identify components with high risk factor which would require the 
development of effective fault tolerance mechanisms.  
 Implementing a tool support for the automation of the proposed risk assessment 
methodology. 
 Validating the methodology. For validating the methodology, we will compare 
our results of the dynamic metrics and the risk factor to the results obtained from 
the simulation model developed in [Yacoub, 2002]. 
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C h a p t e r  3  
Related Work 
 
This chapter discusses previous related work in software metrics, severity analysis 
and risk assessment, critiques the limitations and inadequacies of this research. It draws 
distinctions between prior work and the proposed research. We proceed as follows:  
Software metrics review, severity analysis review and software risk assessment 
review. 
3.1 Software Metrics Review 
Software metrics offer a means to understand the process and product of the 
software [Zuse, 1998]. It is necessary for software quality control [Fenton, 1999b]. The 
most significance benefit of software metrics is that they are designed to provide 
information to support managerial decision making during the software lifecycle. In his 
research, Shyam et al [Shyam, 1998] recommended that the use of various well-constructed 
metrics could be a basis for software managerial decision-making and could provide insight 
into the software design process. Fenton et al [Fenton, 1996] classify software metrics into 
three classes; resource, process and product metrics. Process and product metrics can help 
both managing activities, (such as costing, scheduling, controlling and staffing), and 
engineering activities (such as analyzing, designing, coding, testing and documenting) 
[Abreu, 1996].  
For the purpose of this dissertation our focus is on software product metrics; 




3.1.1 Software Product Metrics 
The field of software product metrics has been a major focus of software metrics 
research [Mills, 1998]. Measuring software products could help in establishing control over 
software development activities [Littlefair, 2001]. Software metrics research has revealed 
that software product metrics can be the basis for software quality predictions, such as 
whether a software module is fault-prone [Taghi, 1999]. Research has shown software 
product metrics to be useful predictors of software faults [Oman, 1997]. Software product 
metrics can quantify the size and complexity of software artifacts in many dimensions. It is 
currently a major determinant of the cost and effort required to develop software product 
[Mills, 1998]. Product metrics incorporated into software predictive models could give 
advanced warning of potential risks [Fenton, 1999mm]. Software product metrics could be 
used to measure software products such as source code or design documents. Because it is 
simple and easy to automate, the number of lines of source code metrics is one of the 
earliest software product metrics [Fenton, 1999]. Other examples of product metrics 
include Halstead [Halstead] and McCabe’s Cyclomatic Complexity [McCabe, 1976]. Since 
the early days of computer science, these traditional metrics are still in use. These 
traditional metrics could be used to quantify the internal structure of procedural software 
systems [Zuse, 1991]. However, the need to quantify the unique features of emerged 
Object Oriented paradigm has given birth, in recent years, to new metric sets. Concepts of 
Object Oriented (OO) design and development have become popular in today's software 
development environment and this motivates the shift of interest from traditional software 
metrics to OO metrics [Chidamber, 1994]. Object oriented development has proved its 
value for those software systems that must be maintained and modified [Rosenberg, 1998].  
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The idea behind the development of object oriented metrics is that they can offer early 
predictors of software components that contain faults (found during testing or that result 
in field failures) or that are costly to maintain [Benlarbi, 1999] [Briand, 1998]. This could 
also let the organization to take mitigating actions early and consequently avoiding costly 
rework. 
3.1.2 Object Oriented Metrics 
A considerable number of object-oriented metrics have been constructed in the past; 
for example, Abreu et al proposed a set of metrics suitable for evaluating the use of main 
abstractions of the Object Oriented paradigm such as inheritance, encapsulation, 
information hiding  [Abreu, 1994].  Benlarbi et al [Benlarbi, 1999] proposed a set of OO 
measures to define and examine the quality impact of polymorphism on OO design. They 
concluded that these measures are significant predictors of fault proneness. Briand et al 
proposed a suite of measures to quantify class coupling during the design of object oriented 
systems [Briand, 1997].  Their results show that some of these coupling measures may be 
useful as quality indicators of the design of OO systems. Chidamber et al developed a new 
suite of metrics for OO design [Chidamber, 1994]. Cartwright and Shepperd [Cartwright, 
2000] described an empirical investigation into an object oriented (OO) system comprised 
of 133,000 lines of C++.  He proposed a prediction system for size and number of defects 
based upon OO classes. To achieve more reliable testing Mei et al [Mei, 1999] proposed a 
set of object oriented metrics that help in selecting effective testing techniques. Kamiva et 
al [Kamiva, 1999] proposed a new method to estimate the fault proneness of the class in the 
early design phase, using several complexity metrics for OO software. In this proposed 
method, they introduced four checkpoints into the analysis / design / implementation phase, 
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and estimated the fault prone classes using the applicable metrics at each checkpoint. Letha 
et al [Letha, 2000] introduced a suite of OO metrics, which offer a more direct mapping 
from the metric to its associated quality factor. Much research has also been done to assess 
the design quality of OO software systems based on OO metrics [Hitz, 1996], [Briand, 
1999b], [Simon, 1997]. Most of these studies did not focus exclusively on those metrics 
that can be collected during the design stage, but were applied to the source code (language 
oriented metrics). The information these metrics need cannot be obtained until the 
algorithm and structure of the class are determined at the end of design the phase. 
However, the estimation of the fault-proneness in the early design phase helps in allocating 
effort for fixing the faults. In order to help assess quality of the software product early on 
during the development process, we have to give particular emphasis to the measurement 
of product design artifacts. Most of these studies have used static analysis of code and 
design documents to quantify the internal software properties. To deal with software failure 
we need to deal with dynamic behavior specification rather than static designs. Despite the 
rich body of research and practice in developing OO metrics, there has been less emphasis 
on dynamic metrics. Dynamic metrics are used to measure the dynamic behavior of a 
system based on the premise that active components are sources of failures [Lake, 1994]. 
The complex dynamic behavior of many real-time applications [Selic, 94] motivates a shift 
in interest from traditional static OO metrics to dynamics metrics.  
3.1.3 Dynamic Metrics 
Briand et al [Briand, 2000] indicated that measures of structural design properties, 
such as coupling or complexity, are widely considered to be indicators of external quality 
attributes, such as reliability.  Dynamic metrics (complexity metrics and coupling metrics) 
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are used to measure the dynamic behavior of a system based on the premise that active 
components are sources of failures [Lake, 1994]. 
Dynamic complexity metrics 
The study of software complexity metrics has long been practiced by scientists and 
engineers. Several studies found a correlation between the number of faults and the 
complexity of the system [Purao, 2003], [Elemam, 1999]. The OO metrics are either based 
on the static view of the design; i.e., its class diagrams, or the source code of the classes. 
The metrics are used to evaluate the complexity of the design structure and, hence, are 
static metrics. Most of these complexity definitions deal with the program at rest. However, 
the level of exposure of a module is a function of its execution environment. Hence, 
dynamic complexity [22] evolved as a measure of complexity of the subset of code that is 
actually executed. Dynamic complexity was discussed by Munson et al [Munson, 1996]. 
They emphasize that it is essential not only to consider complex modules but also how 
frequently they are executed. They define execution profiles for modules that reflect what 
percentage of time a module is executing, and thus derived functional complexity and 
operational complexity as dynamic complexity metrics. Toshihiro et al [Toshihiro, 1999] 
proposed a method to estimate the fault-proneness of the class in the early phase, using 
complexity metrics for object-oriented software. Ammar et al [Ammar, 1997] used Colored 
Petri Nets models to measure dynamic complexity of software systems using simulation 
reports. Poel et al [Poel, 2000] proposed a measures for a specific aspect of the dynamic 
behavior of objects i.e., life cycle complexity using the so-called distance-based approach. 
In chapter 4 we extend the dynamic complexity metrics to measure the quality of object-
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oriented designs. Our approach is based on static analysis of UML statecharts that captures 
the behavior of the UML model.  
Dynamic Coupling Metrics 
Several studies have identified clear empirical relationships between class-level 
coupling and the fault-proneness of the classes. Measures of coupling have been shown to 
be reasonably accurate indicators of external quality attributes [Harrison, 2000]. In his 
research [Aaron, 1998] Aaron et al concluded that coupling metrics may be good predictors 
for run-time failures of a software product. Elemam et al [El-emam, 2001b] performed a 
validation study of object oriented design metrics. The objective of this validation was to 
determine which of these metrics was associated with fault-proneness. They conclude that 
many coupling measures are strongly associated with fault-proneness.  
Coupling between components provides important information for identifying 
possible sources of exporting errors and identifying tightly coupled components. Moser et 
al [Moser,1997] introduced a model for measuring coupling and cohesion; this model is 
defined at the class level, only it does not reflect the dynamic behavior of the object.  Li 
et al [Li, 1993] proposed the Message Passing Coupling (MPC) as a measure of coupling 
between classes which is defined as the number of "send" statements that are passed from 
one class to other classes. But counting the number of send statements does not reflect the 
actual number (frequency) of execution of that send statement. All these coupling 
measures are based on a static view of the software system. To be accurate and cost 
effective, there is a need to measure the dynamic interaction between software 
components early on in the software design phase. 
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The problem of measuring dynamic interaction between objects is addressed in 
[Poels, 2000]. The author proposed object-event association matrix to measure dynamic 
behavior of objects. Arisholm [Arisholm, 2002] proposed dynamic coupling measures, and 
described how dynamic coupling can be calculated by tracing the flow of messages 
between objects at run-time. It is impossible to be applied early on in the design phase; it is 
language and code based metrics. Lilli et al [Lilli, 2000] proposed a coupling metrics based 
on UML models. These metrics do not consider the dynamic behavior of the system.  
Aaron et al [Aaron, 1998] indicated that coupling metrics is a good predictor for run-time 
failure of the software product. Dynamic coupling could therefore be a good indicator for 
connector failure. Yacoub et al [Yacoub, 2000] defined dynamic coupling metrics based on 
UML, the execution of UML simulation model. It is tedious and time consuming to build a 
simulation model for the software system to measure coupling between components.  
In the next chapter we explore the proposed architecture level dynamic coupling 
metrics as measures of coupling between components. These dynamic metrics are 
automatically extracted from UML visual static models.  
3.2 Severity assessment review  
Severity assessment is a procedure by which the severity of a software 
architectural element (component/connector) is estimated and ranked according to the 
consequences of failure. According to MIL_STD_1629A [Mil, 1986], severity considers 
the worst case consequence of a failure, determined by the degree of injury, property 
damage, system damage, and mission loss that could eventually occur.  
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To study the severity of software failure, we propose the Architecture Level 
Severity Analysis Methodology based on the UML model and hazard analysis 
techniques. 
In this section, we review the hazard analysis techniques used with the proposed 
severity methodology, the suitability of UML as a foundation for severity assessment, 
and the related work on severity analysis. 
3.2.1 Hazard analysis techniques 
Hazard analysis techniques have been widely used in the development and 
deployment of safety critical systems that involve computer software [Francesmary 1997], 
[Heimdahl, 1996], [Leveson 1991], [Lutz 1993], [Ratan 1996]. Originally, a hazard 
analysis process is a systematic process for identifying, assessing and controlling hazards. 
The objectives of using any software hazard analysis technique are to identify and correct 
deficiencies and to provide information for the necessary safeguards. Software hazard 
analyses are used to change the software architecture or design, and to identify those 
portions of the software which require increased attention to quality. Software hazard 
analysis should be performed within the context of the overall system design, for those 
attributes of the system design that contribute to the system’s ability to perform the 
assigned tasks.  
Hazard analysis techniques such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) 
[Heimdahl 1996], Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [NASA], Failure Modes 
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) [NASA, 1995 ], Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
[Allenby 2001], Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) [Allenby, 2001], Event Tree 
Analysis (ETA) [NASA 1995], and Functional Failure Analysis (FFA) [Papadopoulos 
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1999] have demonstrated their value in a variety of contexts over the years, and they are 
still widely practiced by safety engineers.  
HAZOP is a technique for identifying and analyzing the hazards and operation 
concerns of a system. In [Zhu, 2002] Hong adapted HAZOP and used it for quality 
modeling software process. McDermid and Pumfrey [McDermid, 1994] proposed a 
HAZOP analysis for identifying the hazardous failure modes of structural software model. 
In [Bishop, 2002], Bishop proposed a HAZOP based approach to support the justification 
of Commercial Off-The-Shelf software (COTS) used in a safety-related system. Hussey in 
[Hussey, 2000] was concerned with providing methods for analyzing safety-critical 
interactive systems to detect design defects that would reduce system safety. The approach 
presented is essentially a variant of the HAZOP. Bishop et al [Bishop 2002], described the 
Software Criticality Analysis approach that was developed using HAZOP.  A HAZOP 
Study investigates the interactions between components and is carried out by a team. It is 
suitable for initial phases of the design. 
The FMEA is an inductive qualitative method of analysis that enables us to identify 
elements having significant effects on system function in considered application. FMEA 
evaluates the ways component of the system can fail and the effects these failures can have. 
In a FMEA, each individual failure is considered as an independent occurrence with no 
relation to other failures in the system. In [Zhu, 2002] FMEA is used for the analysis of 
software and information systems to construct quality models of information systems. 
Cichocki et al [Cichocki, 2000] demonstrate how object oriented modeling, extended with 
formal notations, is used to model a problem related to computer based railway signaling in 
order to support FMEA. FMEA investigates the failures of the components themselves and 
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is often performed by an individual [Chudleigh, 1995]. FMEA identifies single failure 
modes that either directly result in or contribute significantly to system failure. 
FTA is a top-down method used to identify failure causes [NASA, 1995]. FTA is 
primarily a means for analyzing causes of hazards, not identifying them. The process of 
analyzing causes is documented in one or more fault trees. It should be noted that a fault 
tree is not a model of the system or even a model of the ways in which the system could 
fail. It is rather a depiction of the logical interrelationships of the basic events that may 
lead to a particular undesired event. FTA is used to analysis a software hazard 
[Papadopoulos, 1999]. Papadopoulos [Papadopoulos, 2001] summarizes the FTA 
synthesis concept and discusses its application in the course of a continuous life-cycle 
safety assessment process. Traverson in [Traverson, 1998] proposed a formal hazard 
analysis technique using FTA to help designers understand the software requirements. 
They investigated how the results of one safety analysis technique, FTA, are interpreted 
as software safety requirements to be used in the program design process. Leveson et al 
[Leveson, 1999], proposed an approach for the incorporation of safety analysis methods 
in the software development process by using FTA for assessing safety properties of 
software. Hansen et al [Hansen, 1998] investigated, how the results of one fault trees are 
interpreted as software safety requirements to be used in the program design process. Liu 
et al [Liu, 1996] proposed a model-based approach for safety analysis using fault trees. 
Sere et al [Sere, 1997] used the results of FTA as a source of the formulation of 
requirements that the embedded software should meet. The approach proposed by Clarke 
and Clarke et al [Clarke, 1993] is based on representing the weakest precondition of a 
program as a fault tree. FHA approaches the analysis of the top-level design from the 
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functional viewpoint [ARP-4761 1996]. This technique aims to identify which functions 
of the system contribute to hazards, thus assigning them a criticality level. FHA was 
developed by the aerospace industry to bridge the gap between hardware and software 
hazard analysis, since functions are generally identified without specific 
implementations. It requires domain specific knowledge to produce meaningful results 
from Functional Hazard Analysis. The FHA method is used for identifying safety hazards 
at a functional level. It is a powerful method as it gives important input when structuring 
the requirements. In [Papadopoulos 1999] Papadopoulos developed the FFA method by 
extending FHA with guide words used in [McDermid, 2000] similar to the guide words 
used in HAZOP [McDermid, 1995].  
The ETA [NASA, 1995] is a technique by which the system safety engineer can 
evaluate possible outcomes using a type of logic tree. It is an inductive logic method for 
identifying the various possible outcomes of a given initiating event. ETA is appropriate 
only after most of the design is complete. Thus, it has been used primarily to evaluate 
existing designs. In [Lindsay, 2000] Lindsay used ETA for hazard identification and 
analysis. A hazard analysis must be performed early in the software design, before any 
concept or design solutions exist, to avoid costly design iterations. The value of early 
hazard analysis has been thoroughly discussed by Leveson in [Leveson, 1995].  
Automation has become increasingly more important [Gallow, 2002]. As systems 
become more complex, it is progressively less tractable to carry out hazard analyses 
manually. In computer HAZOP, the analysis remains manual activity in which analysts 
are called to identify and relate hazards by examining data flows in software architecture. 
As systems become more complex, manually performed hazard analyses become tedious, 
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error prone, and time-consuming [Lindsay, 2000]. A hazard analysis technique must be 
easy to automate or semi automate.  
As the complexity of modern software systems increases, using one hazard 
analysis technique at different stages of the design lifecycle is becoming increasingly 
more problematic [Papadopoulos 1999], [Lindsay 2000]. These techniques assume 
different design representations which reflect different levels of abstraction in the system 
design. While, for example, FFA requires only abstract functional descriptions, HAZOP 
and FMEA require architectural designs of increasing detail and complexity. We must 
find a methodology to guarantee the consistency of the design as it evolves in the course 
of the lifecycle. All of this motivates the needs for a new hazard analysis technique. 
We integrate more than one classical hazard analysis technique introducing a new 
technique that could be implemented early on in the design phase. This hazard analysis 
technique is used for the severity analysis and it could be automated because it is based 
on data that could be collected as well as analysis from UML diagrams [Hassan, 2003C]. 
3.2.2 UML and hazard analysis 
In this section we discuss UML as a foundation for a new hazard analysis 
technique. To develop a hazard analysis technique, the relationship between the system 
and the environment should be defined sufficiently clearly so it could be possible to 
identify how system failures may cause harm (i.e., the system boundary is clear). The 
UML use case is used to capture requirements in early design phases. Thus, use cases are 
recommended as input to the FFA, to give a good picture of possible functional failures 
in a system [Johannessen, 2001]. In [Wedde, 1999] Wedde proposed the use of HAZOP 
UML based software system design.  
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For successful hazard analysis technique, the operation of the system has to be 
defined sufficiently clearly to indicate how normal or abnormal operation might cause 
system failure, and how the consequences of the system failure depend upon the 
operational state or mode. Because UML diagrams capture the dynamic behavior of the 
system it is a good candidate for a successful hazard analysis technique. Using UML 
[Atkinson 1998] as a foundation for hazard analysis will aid in understanding the system 
behavior before detailed design. By using UML models as a basis for the hazard analysis 
technique, system failures could be designed out of the system before it is developed and 
used.  
The use of UML as a foundation of a new hazard analysis technique is motivated be the 
fact that UML models represent many level of abstraction of the system and capture its 
dynamic and static behavior.  
The next section is the proposed severity analysis methodology which is based on UML 
artifacts. The methodology  
It automates and integrates more than one hazard analysis technique in order to 
assess the severity of each architectural element (component/connector) of the software 
as well as the system level severity.  
3.2.3. Severity analysis  
In [Sherer, 1989] Sherer proposed a methodology to estimate the consequences of 
software failure caused by faults in different software modules.  Sherer used one hazard 
analysis technique FTA and software operational profile to estimate the cost of failure for 
every software module. This is a complex process to be automated and it was applied in 
the later phase of software development life cycle.  Yacoub et al [Yacoub, 2002] used 
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FMEA to assess the severity of software (components/connectors) failure. Using one 
hazard analysis technique for severity analysis usually fails to offer a coherent and 
complete picture of the ways in which low-level component failures contribute to 
hazardous malfunctions of the system. Yacoub and Sherer used one hazard analysis 
technique. Hazard analysis techniques assume different design representations which 
reflect different levels of abstraction in the system design. While, for example, FFA 
requires only abstract functional descriptions, HAZOP and FMEA require architectural 
designs of increasing detail and complexity. It is not necessarily enough to use only one 
analysis technique [Allenby, 2001]. Often a combination of more than one technique, based 
on UML, should be used in order to gain a more complete understanding of the system 
[Hassan, 2003b].  
In chapter 6 we propose a methodology for severity analysis based on UML 
diagrams. The proposed methodology is based on a number of classical hazard 
techniques such as FFA, FMEA and FTA. It automates and integrates these techniques in 
order to assess the severity of each architectural element (component/connector) of the 
software.  
3.3 Risk Assessment  
A wide range of traditional fault-proneness prediction models has been proposed 
for assessing the fault proneness of a software system. These models use complexity and 
size metrics to predict software components fault proneness. These models are quantitative 
models that can be used to predict which software components are high risk keeping in 
mind that the definition of a high risk component varies depending on the context. For 
example, a high risk component may be one that contains any faults found during testing 
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[Briand, 1993a], [Lanubile, 1997], [Harrison, 1988], or one that contains any faults found 
during operation [Khoshgoftaar, 1999], or one that is costly to correct after an error has 
been found [Almeida, 1998], [Basili, 1997], [Briand, 1993b]. Some models make binary 
predictions as to whether a software component is faulty or not-faulty [El-Emam, 1999], 
[El-Emam, 2001a], [Khoshgoftaar, 1999], [Lanubile, 1997]. These models are also used for 
ranking software components according to risk proneness.  
Silke et al [Silke, 1999] proposed a model to estimate the probability of failure of a 
software system consisting of components. Briand et al [Briand, 1998] used multivariate 
logistic regression to build a prediction model for the fault-proneness of classes. Ping et al 
[Ping, 2000] proposed a statistical technique of mixture model analysis as a tool for early 
prediction of fault-prone software modules. Lanubile et al [Lanubile, 1995] proposed a 
model for identifying high/low-risk of software components based on software complexity 
metrics. Maurizio et al [Maurizio, 1997] proposed a model to predict defect-prone software 
modules in a software system based on its complexity. Hochman et al [Hochman, 1996] 
applied the genetic algorithm to developing optimal or near optimal back propagation 
neural networks for fault-prone/not-fault-prone classification of software modules. 
Toshihiro et al [Toshihiro, 1999] proposed a method to estimate the fault-proneness of the 
class in the early phase, using several complexity metrics for object-oriented software. 
Wong et al [Wong, 1998] proposed hybrid metrics to identify fault-prone software 
modules. Benlarbi [Benlarbi, 1999] proposed a model that serves as an early predictors of 
classes that contain faults.  
But all of these traditional models do not consider the fact that the consequences of 
various software failures caused by faults will be very different. Science software failures 
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have different consequences; any measure of software fault proneness must include the 
measurement of the consequence of failure (severity). 
Based on the definition of heuristic risk factor [Ammar, 1997] as a measure of risk, 
Yacoub et al [Yacoub, 2002] developed an architecture level risk assessment methodology 
of software system taking into consideration the severity of software failure. Yacoub used a 
set of dynamic metrics extracted from a simulation model of the UML artifacts and used 
the FMEA for severity assessment. But risk assessment based on UML simulation model is 
time consuming and tedious work. Using FMEA only for severity analysis is not enough as 
we mentioned earlier in “Hazard Analysis Review”.  
To help in developing risk based test plans, we propose a risk assessment 
methodology for the software architecture. This methodology is based on measurements 
that could be collected and analyzed early on in the software life cycle. It considers the 
severity of software failure as well as the probability of that failure. This methodology is 
performed integrating more than one hazard analysis technique based on dynamic 
specification of static UML model. To automate the proposed methodology we have 
proposed a tool support for the automation of this methodology.  
3.4 Summary 
This literature review indicates the absence of research for early software product 
risk assessment. Most of the work does not differentiate between risk assessment and fault 
proneness. It also indicates the lake of concrete methodologies for risk assessment early on 
the design phases. This literature review indicates that there is a need for clear methods for 




C h a p t e r  4  




The fact that the usage of metrics in the analysis and design of object oriented OO 
software can help designers make better decisions is gaining relevance in the software 
measurement arena [Fenton, 2000]. Moreover, the necessity of having early indicators of 
external quality attributes, such as maintainability, based on early metrics is growing. 
These metrics are based either on the static view of the design; i.e., its class 
diagrams, [Marcela, 2003] or the source code [Chidamber, 1994] of the classes. These 
static metrics deal with the class code or the structure of the class. These types of static 
metrics do not consider the class behavior or its execution environment. However, the 
level of exposure of a software component is a function of its execution environment. 
Hence, dynamic metrics [Khoshgoftaar, 1993] evolved as a measure of complexity of the 
subset of code that is actually executed. Dynamic metrics was discussed by Munson et al 
[Munson, 1996] for reliability assessment purposes. The authors emphasized that it is 
essential to consider complex modules and its frequency of execution, in addition to its 
complexity. Ammar et al [Ammar, 1997] extended dynamic metrics definitions to 
incorporate concurrency complexity. They further used Colored Petri Nets models to 
measure dynamic complexity of software systems using simulation reports. To measure 
the dynamic behavior of an object in OO system Poel et al [Poel, 1999] define a so-called 
distance-based approach, which describes and measures the dynamic behavior of objects. 
Yacoub et al [Yacoub, 1999] proposed a dynamic metrics (dynamic complexity and 
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dynamic coupling) based on the execution of UML simulation model of the software 
system.  Using simulation model of the system to measure dynamic metrics is a more 
tedious and time consuming process than using UML models at system design phase.  
In this chapter, we build up on metrics proposed in [Yacoub, 1999] to estimate the 
dynamic metrics (complexity and coupling) of a software architectural element 
(component/connector) early on the software design phase. This proposed approach 
[Hassan, 2001] is based on static analysis of UML diagrams of the software system not 
based on execution of the simulation models as proposed in [Yacoub, 1999]. The 
proposed dynamic complexity metrics could be used for the estimation of probability of 
software component/connector failure early on the design phase of the software life cycle 
[Katerina, 2003].  
The software system design phase serves as the foundation for all software 
engineering steps that follow. Design phase is important in this respect, since many of the 
critical decisions stem from the product design. In the design phase, it's still cost-effective 
to modify the software design, and the software can also be described accurately enough 
to be measurable [Roger, 1997]. Our proposed dynamic metrics is based on UML 
diagrams developed at the design phase.  
We proceed in this chapter as follows: Section 4.2 describes the dynamic 
complexity metrics, Section 4.3 describes the dynamic coupling metrics, Case study is 
presented in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 is the conclusion. 
4.2 Dynamic Complexity Metrics 
Dynamic complexity metrics guide the process of identifying complex 
components. As a result, components could be ranked based its complexity. Components 
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in a system have a life cycle; they enter into an initial state after creation, when they are 
triggered (e.g. by messages, events, etc), and may change state. At some moment in time, 
they enter an ending state. The life of component in a system is a dynamic property. We 
need some kind of state transition model to measure component complexity during its life 
cycle [Poels, 1999]. The state machine view describes the dynamic behavior of 
components over the time by modeling the lifecycle of components. Each component is 
treated as an isolated entity that communicates with the rest of the world by detecting 
events and responding to them. A transition defines the response of a component in the 
state to the occurrence of an event. A statechart store information about component life 
cycle and component behavior [Booch, 1999]. Both the number of states in the state chart 
as well as the number of transitions can be measures for a component's dynamic 
complexity [Khoshgoftaar, 1999]. 
Based on state diagrams of the UML model, we could estimate dynamic 
complexity metrics. This metrics could be estimated during a specific scenario of 
interaction (sequence diagram). Based on a state chart of components interacted during 
sequence diagram, we could compute dynamic metrics for each component. 
Measurements could be extended for all scenarios under specific use case. Also use case 
and system level complexity could be estimated by providing the profile of operation of 
all scenarios and use cases.  
4.2.1 Dynamic complexity of a component ( )xidco  
In 1976 McCabe introduced cyclomatic complexity as a measure of program 
complexity [McCabe, 1976]. It is obtained from the control flow graph and defined 
as 2+−= neCC , where e  is number of edges and n  is number of nodes in the control 
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flow graph. We propose a measure of component complexity similar to McCabe’s 
cyclomatic complexity. However, in contrast to McCabe’s cyclometric complexity, 
which is based on the control flow graph of the source code, the proposed metric for 
component’s dynamic complexity is based on the UML state charts that are available 
during early stages of the software life cycle. The state chart of a component i  has a 
number of states and transition between these states that describe the dynamic behavior 
of the component. For each scenario xS  a subset of all states of component i  are visited 
and a subset of all transitions is traversed. Let xiC  denote the subset of states for a 
component i  visited in the scenario xS and with 
x
iT  the subset of transitions traversed in 
the state chart of component i  in the scenario xS . The subset of states 
x
iC  and the 
corresponding transitions xiT  are mapped into a control flow graph. The number of nodes 
in this graph is xi
x
i Cc = ; this number is the cardinality of
x
iC . Similarly, the number of 
edges in this graph is xi
x
i Tt = ; this number is the cardinality of
x
iT . It follows that the 
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4.2.2 Normalized dynamic complexity of a component ( )xiDOC  
The normalized dynamic complexity xiDOC  of a component i  in scenario xS  is 
obtained by normalizing the dynamic complexity xidco  with respect to the sum of 
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where xiDOC  (0 ≤ 
x
iDOC  ≤ 1) is the normalized complexity of the 
thi  component 
in the scenario xS . This normalized complexity is used as the probability of failure of a 
component [Hassan, 2001]. 
4.3 Dynamic Coupling Metrics 
Coupling between components provides important information for identifying 
possible sources of exporting errors, identifying tightly coupled components, and testing 
interactions between components. The proposed dynamic coupling metrics extend the 
previous work in [Yacoub, 1999]; measurements are calculated for the design model 
during a specific scenario. Furthermore, they can be extended for all scenarios in all use 
cases of the system. The dynamic coupling of a connector is based on the number of 
messages that are carried by the connector. 
Our approach in this part is to calculate the measurements directly from the UML 
scenario diagrams, not from execution of the simulation model [Yacoub, 1999]. Dynamic 
coupling metrics calculated from simulation models [Yacoub, 1999] are defined as export 
dynamic coupling and import dynamic coupling. The difference between export and 
import coupling is in the direction of data and control flow from/to a component in the 
architecture. Export coupling dealings with coupling as a component sends messages or 
data to other components. Import coupling dealings with coupling as a component 
receives messages or data from other components in the architecture. We use export 
dynamic coupling for this proposed dynamic coupling. Export coupling accounts for the 
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fact that an error in a currently executing component could be exported to the called 
component.  
4.3.1 Normalized dynamic coupling of a connector  ( )xijEOC  
Define xijEOC  as a measure of mutual coupling between two specific components 
( i  and j  ). Let denote with xijMT  the set of messages sent from component i  to 
component j  during the execution of scenario xS  and with 
xMT  the set of all messages 
exchanged between all components active during the execution of scenario xS . Then, we 
define the export coupling xijEOC  from component i  to component j  in scenario xS  as a 
ratio of the number of messages sent from i  to j  and the total number of messages 
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Where xijEOC  (0 ≤ 
x
ijEOC  ≤ 1) is the normalized coupling for the connector 
between thi  and thj components in the scenario xS . Normalized dynamic coupling of a 
connector is used as the probability of failure of connector between components 
[Katerina, 2003]. 
4.4 Case study 
In this section, we explain the specifications of Cardiac Pacemaker system. Also 
we show how the proposed methodology applied using this case study as illustrative 
example. Cardiac pacemaker is an implanted device that assists cardiac functions when 
the underlying pathologies lower intrinsic heartbeats. An error in the software operation 
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of the device can cause loss of a patient’s life. This is an example of a critical real-time 
application. We use the UML Real-Time notion [Rational, 2001] to model the 
pacemaker. Figure 4.1 shows the components and connectors of the pacemaker in the 
capsule diagram [Yacoub, 1999]. The Figure also shows the input/output port to the 
Heart as an external component as well as the two input ports to the ReedSwitch and the 
CoilDriver components. A pacemaker can be programmed to operate in one of the five 
operational modes depending on which part of the heart is to be sensed and which part is 
to be paced. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 the components and connectors of the pacemaker in the capsule diagram 
 
The main components of the cardiac pacemaker system are described as follows:  
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ReedSwitch(RS): A magnetically activated switch that must be closed before 
programming the device. The switch is used to avoid accidental programming by electric 
noise.  
CoilDriver(CD): Receives/sends pulses from/to the device programmer. These pulses are 
counted and then interpreted as bit values of zero or one. These bits are then grouped into 
bytes and sent to the communication gnome. Positive and negative acknowledgments, as 
well as programming bits, are sent back to the programmer to confirm whether the device 
has been correctly programmed and the commands validated.  
CommunicationGnome(CG): Receives bytes from the Coil Driver, verifies these bytes as 
commands, and sends the commands to the Ventricular and Atrial models. It sends the 
positive and negative acknowledgments to the Coil Driver to verify command processing. 
AtrialModel(AR) and VentricularModel(VT): These two components are similar in 
operation. They both could pace the heart and/or sense the heartbeats. Once the 
pacemaker is programmed, the magnet is removed from the RS. The AR and VT 
communicate together without further intervention. Only battery decay or some medical 
maintenance reasons may force reprogramming. 
4.4.1 The Use case model 
The pacemaker runs in either a programming mode or in one of five operational 
modes. During programming, the programmer specifies the operation mode in which the 
device will work. The operation mode depends on whether the Atrial (A), Ventricular (V) 
or both are being monitored or paced. The programmer also specifies whether the pacing 
is inhibited (I), triggered (T) or dual (D). For example in the AVI operation mode, the 
Atrial portion (A) of the heart is paced (shocked), the Ventricular portion (V) of the heart 
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is sensed (monitored) and the Atrial is only paced when a Ventricular sense does not 
occur (inhibited mode). The use case diagram of the pacemaker application is given in 
Figure 4.2. It presents the six use cases the two actors namely doctor's programmer and 
patient's heart. Each use case in Figure 4.2 is realized by at least one sequence diagram 
(i.e., scenario). Domain experts determine probabilities of occurrence of use cases and the 
scenarios within each use case. This can be done in a similar fashion as the estimation of 
the operational profile in the field of software reliability [Musa, 1996]. 
According to [Douglass, 2000], inhibit modes are more frequently used than the 
triggered mode [Douglass, 2000]. Also, the programming mode is executed significantly 
less frequently than the regular usage of the pacemaker in any of its operational modes. 
Hence, we assume the probabilities for programming use case of five operational use 


















Use case Programming AVI AAI VVI AAT VVT 
Probability 0.01 0.29 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.15 
 
Table 4.1 Probabilities of the use cases executions 
 
In the programming use case, the programmer interacts with the RS and CD 
components to input a set of 8 bits specifying an operation mode for the pacemaker. This 
byte is received by the CG component, which, in turn, sets the operation mode of the AR 
and VT components to one of five modes (or use cases): AVI, AAI, AAT, VVI, and VVT. 
Appendix A shows a scenario from the AVI use case in which the VT keeps sensing the 
heart and the AR paces the heart whenever a heart beat is not sensed. As in all scenarios, a 
refractory period is then in effect after every pace. Every use case is mapped to one 
scenario. The first is Programming scenario in which the programmer sets the operation 
mode of the device. The programmer applies a magnet to enable communication with the 
device, and then sends pulses to the device which in turn interpret these pulses into 
programming bits. The device then sends back the data to acknowledge valid/invalid 
program. The second scenario is the AVI scenario. In this scenario, the VT component 
monitors the heart. When a heart beat is not sensed, the AR component paces the heart 
and a refractory period is then in effect. The third (fourth) scenario is the VVI (AAI) 
scenario in which the VT component (AR component) paces the heart when it does not 
sense any heart pulse. The fifth (sixth) scenario is the VVT (AAT) in which the VT 
component (AR component) continuously paces the heart. 
The detailed scenario diagrams and the rest of the results of the pacemaker are 
shown in appendix A. 
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Figure 4.3 shows the sequence diagram of the programming scenario of the 
pacemaker system, which we use to illustrate dynamic complexity of components interact 





Figure 4.3 Sequence diagram of the programming scenario 
4.4.2 Dynamic complexity of components 
As described in section 4.2 we use a measure of component complexity similar to 
McCabe’s cyclomatic complexity. However, in contrast to McCabe’s cyclometric 
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complexity, which is based on the control flow graph of the source code, the state chart of 
each component i  has a number of states and transition between these states that describe 
the dynamic behavior of the component. For each scenario xS  a subset of all states of 
component i  are visited and a subset of all transitions is traversed.  Figure 4.4 shows a 
subset of states of CD component in the programming scenario. The control flow graph 
of the CD component in the programming scenario is presented in Figure 4.4. The 
dynamic complexity of this graph is evaluated using equation 4.1 and normalized with 
respect to the sum of complexities of all active components in this scenario (RS, CD, and 
CG) using equation 4.2.  
Table 4.2 shows the normalized dynamic complexity for all components active in 
the programming scenario.  
 















Table 4.2 Normalized dynamic complexity of components in the programming scenario 
 
Dynamic complexity of all components interacts within the pacemaker scenarios 
are given in Table 4-3. 
Component Dynamic Complexity Scenario 
Name RS CD CG AR VT 
Programming 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 
AVI 0.0 0.0 0.00017 0.60135 0.34837 
AAI 0.0 0.0 0.0009 0.999 0.0 
VVI 0.0 0.0 0.0009 0.0 0.999 
AAT 0.0 0.0 0.0005 0.9995 0.0 
VVT 0.0 0.0 0.0005 0.0 0.9995 
Table 4.3 component dynamic complexity for all scenarios in pacemaker. 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the 3D pars for components dynamic complexity Vs scenarios 
in the pacemaker system. 
 
Figure 4.5 3D pars for components dynamic complexity Vs scenarios  
of the pacemaker. 
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We conclude from table 4.3 and Figure 4.5 that the dynamic complexity of the 
component AR and VT are significantly higher than those for other components in more 
than one scenario. This is due to the fact that those two components are active and 
executing most of the time.  
4.4.3 Dynamic coupling of connectors 
Dynamic coupling metrics are calculated for active connectors during execution 
of a specific scenario. We compute these metrics directly from the UML sequence 
diagrams by applying the set of formulas given in section 4.3. Based on equation 4.3, we 
calculate dynamic coupling of connectors in the programming scenario shown in Table 
4.4 shows the dynamic coupling matrix for the connectors in this scenario. 
We use the matrix representation for coupling where rows and columns are 
indexed by components and the off-diagonal matrix cells represent coupling between the 
two components of the corresponding row and column [Hassan, 2001]. The row index 
indicates the sending component, while the column index indicates the receiving 
component. For example, the cell with row=RS and column=CD is the export coupling 
value from RS to CD. On the other side, the cell with row=CD and column=RS is the 
export coupling value from CD to RS. For example, the value along the row RS and the 
column CD in table 4.4 is 0.125. This is read as dynamic coupling of the connector from 
RS to CD. 
 RS CD CG 
RS 0 0.125 0.125 
CD 0 0 0.375 
CG 0 0.375 0 
Table 4.4 Dynamic coupling of connectors in the programming scenario 
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Table 4-5 and Figure 4.6 show the results from applying the proposed dynamic 
coupling metrics for all connectors for all scenarios of the pacemaker system. 
Connector Dynamic Coupling Scenario 
Name RS-CD RS-CG CD-CG CG-CD CG-AR CG-VT AR-VT VT-AR 
Programming 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
AVI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.90E-04 3.90E-04 0.097 0.9 
AAI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
VVI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 
AAT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
VVT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 
 
Table 4.5 dynamic coupling for every connector in each scenario for pacemaker system 
 
 
Figure 4.6 3D par for connectors dynamic coupling Vs scenarios  
 
These results have identified that components  CG, AR, VT are the most dynamic 
coupled components; this is due to the fact that these components are the most active 
components in more than one scenario and these components send messages to each 
other most of the time. These components usually communicate with each other and with 
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the heart for sensing and monitoring. These components control the operational 
processing of the system.  
4.4.4 Validating the Dynamic metrics 
In order to validate the proposed dynamic metrics we compared the predicted 
results derived from the proposed dynamic metrics with those derived from the 
simulation model built in [Yacoub, 1999] for the same case study. 
The idea of using simulation models to evaluate predictive techniques is explored 
in [Shepperd, 2001]; Shepperd proposed the using a simulation model results for 
evaluating four predictive techniques. 
To compare the results obtained by the proposed metrics with the results obtained 
from the simulation model [Yacoub, 1999]; we average the components/connectors 
dynamic metrics for all scenarios in the pacemaker system based on the operational 
profile of the pacemaker system. Table 4.6 and Figure 4.7 show the system level 
component dynamic complexity and the simulation results obtained in [Yacoub, 1999]. 
The correlation of the result obtained by the two methods is shown.  
 
System level component dynamic complexity 
 RS CD CG AR VT 
Dynamic complexity 
 normalized  




Simulation Model results 
Normalized to the maximum one 0.002 0.013 0.005 1 
 
0.963 
Correlation = 0.99732405 
 

































Figure 4.7 System level component dynamic complexities vs. simulation model result 
 
Table 4-7 and Figure 4.8 show the system level results derived from the proposed 
dynamic coupling and the results derived from the simulation. 
 
System level dynamic coupling  
 RS-CD RS-CG CD-CG CG-CD CG-AR CG-VT AR-VT VT-AR
Dynamic coupling 
 normalized to  
the maximum one 0.003570.00357 0.0107 0.0107 1 1 0.0803 0.7455
Simulation Model result 
Normalized to the maximum one 0.0014 0.0014 0.003 0.002 0.0014 0.0014 0.25 0.27 
Correlation = 0.088739 
 
















































From Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 the comparison shows a high correlation for 
dynamic complexity but poor correlation for dynamic coupling. This may be due to the 
fact that Yacoub [Yacoub, 1999] counted the message exchange between heart and 
programmer in his calculation but this is not the case in our calculation. We do not 
consider the heart and programmer as a part of our software system; we consider heart 
and programmer as external actors. They are not part of the pacemaker software system.  
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we define two dynamic metrics (dynamic complexity/dynamic 
coupling) for software architectural element (component/connector). Measurements using 
these proposed metrics can be obtained at early development phases from UML models. 
The metrics are applied to a pacemaker case study and measurements are compared to 
results from execution models [Yacoub, 1999] to show the validity of the metrics. The 
comparison shows a high correlation of the proposed method with the simulation results 
obtained in [Yacoub, 1999] for dynamic complexity. The results of dynamic coupling 
show low correlation with [Yacoub, 1999]. This low correlation could be because 
Yacoub [Yacoub, 1999] considers actors at every scenario as a part of the software 
system. He considers the messages exchanged between the actors and the system as a part 
of all messages exchanged in each scenario. We consider the actors at every scenario as 
external entity and actors are not part of our software system. We do not consider the 
messages exchanged between the actors and the system as part of our calculations. In 
future work, we could validate coupling metrics using another case study. We could also  
explore the dependency between static and dynamic metrics, and empirically validate the 
proposed metrics and their correlation with design quality attributes. 
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C h a p t e r  5  
UML Based  Severity Analysis Methodology 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Severity assessment is a procedure by which the severity of failures of software 
architectural element (component/connector) is estimated and ranked accordingly to the 
consequences of these failures. In the MIL_STD_1629A standard [MIL_STD, 1986], 
severity considers the worst case consequence of a failure, determined by the degree of 
injury, property damage, system damage, and mission loss that could eventually occur. 
Considering the severity of software failures will help in allocating development 
and testing resources [Rosenberg, 1999]. Some software modules may be tested more 
intensively than others based on the severity of failure weighted by the probability of 
failure. In [Katerina, 2003], we proposed an architectural level software risk assessment 
methodology. The proposed risk methodology combined the probability of software 
failure with the severity of this failure to estimate the risk factor of software architectural 
element early on the software design phase. The probability of failure is estimated based 
on software dynamic metrics [Hassan, 2001]. In this report we propose a methodology 
for estimating severity of failures of software components/connectors as well as severity 
of failures of system execution scenarios early on during software development. 
Sherer in [Sherer, 1988] proposed a methodology to estimate the consequences of 
software failure caused by faults in different software modules. Sherer used FTA and 
software operational profile to estimate the cost of failure for every software module. 
This is a complex process to be automated and it was applied at the code level in the later 
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phases of software development. Yacoub et al [Yacoub, 2002] used FMEA to assess the 
severity of software (components/connectors) failure. Using one hazard analysis 
technique for severity analysis usually fails to offer a coherent and complete picture of 
the ways in which low-level component failures contribute to hazardous malfunctions of 
the system. Hazard analysis techniques assume different design representations which 
reflect different levels of abstraction in the system design. While, for example, FFA 
requires only abstract functional descriptions, HAZOP [McDermid, 1995] and FMEA 
require architectural designs of increasing detail and complexity. As shown by Allenby and 
Kelly in [Allenby, 2001] it is not enough to only use one severity analysis technique in 
complex systems. Often a combination of more than one technique should be used to get 
a more complete understanding of the system. The suitability of UML [Boosh, 1999] to 
be the specification language for severity analysis using more than one classical hazard 
analysis method was briefly discussed in [Hassan, 2003b], [Guiochet, 2003]. We propose 
a methodology for severity analysis of software systems at the early phases of 
development based on UML. This chapter is organized as follows, Section 5.2 presents 
the proposed methodology; Section 5.3 presents the illustrative case study; and Section 
5.4 provides the conclusions and future work. 
5.2 The proposed severity analysis methodology 
The proposed severity analysis methodology starts early in the development phase 
with FFA which uses system level scenario diagrams as an input to identify all system 
level hazards [Johannessen, 2001]. This high level FFA analysis gives us a 
comprehensive view of the ways in which the system could fail. System level failures 
arise as a result of failures or malfunctions of lower level components/connectors. 
 
 50
Therefore we apply FMEA as the second step of the process, at the level of components 
and connectors using UML sequence diagrams to determine their failure modes and cost 
of failure for each failure mode. We use FTA as a third step to define a relationship 
between failures of individual architecture elements (component/connector) and a failure 
of the system. The system hazards identified in step 1 will be used as top events in the 
fault tree and the basic events are the failure modes identified in step 2. The fourth step of 
this process is to develop the cost of failure graph [Sherer, 1988] to estimate cost of 
failure for each execution scenario and every component/connector in the scenario. The 
final step is to map estimated cost of failure of scenario and each component/connector to 
a severity rank using the cost severity graph introduced in [Kmenta, 2000].  
Figure 5.1 shows the schematic diagram of the proposed severity analysis 
methodology, and the steps of the methodology for a given scenario are summarized as 
follows:  
1. Identify system hazards (states of the system that can contribute to accidents 
and mishaps) by performing FFA [Carpenter, 1999]. 
2. Identify components/connectors failure modes by performing FMEA 
[MIL_STD, 1986]. 
3. Construct a detailed cause and effect model that records how failures propagate 
from components/connectors level through the system level by using FTA. This 
step combines the outputs from step 1 and step 2. 
4. Develop the Cost of Failure Graph to estimate cost of failure of a given 




5. Estimate the severity of each component/connector and system scenario using 
cost of failure graph [Sherer, 1988] and cost severity graph [Kmenta, 2000]. 
FFA  
Cost of Failure 
GraphFTA
FMEA
(Complete List of Failure modes
of Components/Connectors)
Object : Class








(List of scenario 
level Hazards)


















Figure 5.1 severity analysis methodology schematic diagram  
5.2.1 Functional Failure Analysis (FFA) 
Figure 5.2 shows a UML use case diagram for a system S, where actor Act1   
performs the two Use Cases Uc1 and Uc2 through association Ass1 and Ass2, and actor 
Act2 performs the Use Case Uc1 through Ass3.  Figure 5.3 shows a high level system 
sequence diagram [Carpenter, 1999] which describes one scenario of the Use Case Uc1 
showing the interactions between actors Act1, Act2 and the system through input and 
output events. Events like E11s, E21s, E3s1, and E4s1 are the events between the system S 
and Act1. Events E1s2, E22s, and E3s2 are events between the System S and the Act2. The 
system states are S1, S2, S3, and S4 ,which are the states of the system after receiving or 
 
 52
sending event to the external actors (Act1, Act2 ) The input events (E11s, E21s, E22s ) in 
Figure 5.3 represent external events that stimulate responses from the system. The output 

























Figure 5.3 high level system sequence diagram 
The process starts with FFA based on the annotated system scenario diagram 
Figure 5.4. We perform FFA using guide words defined in Table 5-1 [McDermid, 2000] 
to identify possible failure modes for each event between the system and the actors (E11s, 
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E21s, E22s..,….), and (Act1, Act2 ).  The events are systematically examined for potential 
hazards which include the loss of event, the unintended delivery of event and event 
malfunctions. The analysis considers each event in turn and decides whether or not these 
hypothetical failure modes are credible and, if they are, what the consequences might be. 
This gives a clear view of how the failure of these events could contribute to hazards and 
accidents during the scenario. The input to FFA is a list of events of system level scenario 
belonging to Uc1, list of guide words [McDermid, 2000], and cost of failure for every 
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List of Guide Words, Cost of hazard
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Figure 5.4 The annotated system level sequence diagram of use case UC1 for 
system S 
The output of FFA is a tabulated form (see Table 5-2). The results of FFA are 
provided early in the design process; these results provide a comprehensive picture of the 
ways that the system could fail.  
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Guide Word Meaning 
Omission A necessary action does not occur. 
Commission An unwanted action is performed. 
Early An action is performed before the time (either real time,  
or relative to some other action) at which it is required. 
Late An action is performed after the time at which it is required. 
Value The timing of the action is correct, but the data with which it is 
performed with or upon is incorrect. 
Table 5-1 Guide words 
5.2.2 Components/Connectors Failure Modes 
FMEA examines component/connector failures considering component/connector 
malfunctions.  
It generates a failure model for the components/connectors under examination; 
FMEA is essentially a tabular process. FMEA is applied for each component/connector 
within the sequence diagram. During specific scenario, components interact with each 
other by exchanging messages. Each of these interactions links a component that requests 
an operation with a component that performs the operation. All these interactions, 
collaboration and component behavior are captured in sequence diagrams. For example 






















Figure 5.5 Sequence diagram of components C1, C2 and C3 interaction 
 
The “initiating” actor Act1 starts the scenario by sending the initial event to the 
system. The sequence diagram models messages (M12, M21 , M13…) sequence among 
components C1, C2, C3, and actors Act1, Act2.  
The behavior of each component could be captured with the component state 
diagram during this scenario. The component changes its states through interactions 
based on message exchange. A hazard occurs from unwanted interactions (or events). 
Each of the unwanted events in the sequence is either due to a message being sent 
incorrectly by the sender component, or the message not being acted on correctly by the 
receiver component or the connector not acting well. These events can be generated by 
sender or receiver state transitions. Therefore faults in component state or transitions can 
give reasons for a component/connector failure [Lindsay, 1997]. It is necessary to 
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confirm that under correct behavior of components/connectors, the system doesn’t allow 
the occurrence of the hazards. That is, if the components in the system correctly generate 
the intended messages, are in the correct state, and connector transmit correct message, 
then the system will not fail. This means that no failure will happen to 
components/connector.  
In order to identify possible faulty behaviors for the components we can apply 
FMEA to the states of the components [DiMarco, 1995], [Charles, 1997]. We identify 
hazards associated with each component, detail all possible failure modes, and identify 
their resulting effect on the system. The output of this process is a tabulated form (see 
Table 5-3 section 5.3.2). 
A Connector is defined as the interface between two components [Yacoub, 2003]. 
The Connector transmits the messages between the components. By applying FMEA on 
connectors using the messages transmitted through these connectors, we can identify 
connectors’ failure modes and the effect of these failures on the system. We identify 
hazards associated with each connector, detail all possible failure modes, and identify 
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Figure 5.6 Annotated sequence diagram 
5.2.3 Fault Tree Analysis 
FTA is a top-down method used to identify failure causes [Kirsten, 1998]. FTA is 
primarily a means for analyzing causes of hazards, not identifying hazards. The process 
of analyzing causes is documented in one or more fault trees. FTA is a depiction of the 
logical interrelationships of the basic events that may lead to a particular undesired event. 
FTA is used for addressing low level failure conditions (basic events) and their potential 
effect for causing the top level hazards (top events) [Johannessen, 2001]. Failure of 
components/connectors (low level) will propagate to the system level (higher level). We 
use FTA to map system level hazards (output from FFA) to components/connectors 
failure modes (output from FMEA). The top events of the fault trees are the system level 




5.2.4 Cost of Failure Graph 
Kmenta in [Kmenta, 2000] describes failure scenarios as “undesired cause-effect 
chains of events, from the initiating cause to end effect, including all intermediate 
effects”. Each failure scenario happens with some probability and results in negative 
consequences. With FTA considered as a cause effect model [Liu, 2000], using FTA 
results in many cause effect chains with probabilities for each cause and effect. These 
cause-effect chains relate the system level hazard identified from FFA to 
components/connectors failure modes identified from FMEA. Considering these cause-
effect chains as failure scenarios for the system, we could estimate the cost of failure of 
each component/connector based on these failure scenarios. 
Cost is an accepted measure of consequences [Gilchrist, 1993]. Expected cost is 
used extensively in the fields of Risk Analysis, Economics, Insurance, and Decision 
Theory [Gilchrist, 1993]. Kmenta and Ishii [Kmenta, 2000] proposed an adaptation of 
FMEA considering the consequences of the failures in terms of costs. Cost is a universal 
language understood by engineers without ambiguity. We develop cost of failure graph 
for every component/connector and scenario to estimate cost of failure of every 
component/connector and scenario. For a specific component/connector there is more 
than one failure scenario, the expected cost of failure for component/connector is the sum 
of all costs over these scenarios weighted by the probability of each failure scenario.  
We develop a component/connector cost of failure graph [Sherer, 1988] to 
estimate the component/connector and scenario cost of failure using annotated UML 




During the execution of a system scenario xS , there are many hazards. These 
hazards and their consequences are identified in step 1 using FFA technique. In step 3 we 
estimate the probability of each of these hazards. The expected cost of failure of a system 
scenario may be estimated by summing the expected uses of the scenario, weighted by 
the expected consequences of all hazards that may result from these uses. Using the 
probability of usage of the scenario [Katerina, 2003], probability, and cost of these 
hazards for this scenario (results from step 1 and step 3) we could estimate the cost of 
failure of this scenario using the cost of failure graph as shown in step 4 of the 
methodology. 
Definitions: 
( )x iCost M  : The cost of failure of (component/connector) i  in a given failure 
mode M in a given system scenario xS .  
( )x ip M         : The probability of (component/connector)  i  being in failure mode 
M  in a given system scenario xS .  
( )x p H        : The probability of system level hazard  H  for a given system 
scenario xS .  




Total expected cost of failure of (component/connector)  i  in a given system 
scenario xS  is as follows: 
1 1





TotalCost p k p j
==
= =
= ∑ ∑   * ( )x iCost j                       (1) 
( )x p S           :Probability of execution of a given scenario xS   [Katerina, 2003] 
The total expected cost of failure of a given scenario xS  is estimated as follows: 
1
( ) ( ) ( )* ( )
k H
x x x x
k
TotalCost S p S p k Cost k
=
=
= ∑                                           (2) 
 
5.2.5 System scenario and components/connectors severity 
The cost of failure metrics is a measure of consequences [Kmenta, 2000], and 
basing on this the cost of failure could be mapped on a 0.1-1.0 severity rank (cost 
severity graph) Figure 5.7. 
 
 
Figure 5.7 Cost-severity graph 
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Using cost-severity graph, we map the expected cost of failure of 
component/connector as well as system scenario on a severity rank as shown in Figure 
5.7 cost-severity graph. The cost-severity curve depends on the application domain. For 
example in Health care, the cost of out-patient care would have a severity rank between 
0.1-0.3, whereas in-patient care would have a severity rank between 0.3-0.6, followed by 
the cost-severity of intensive care. In general, the cost-severity relationship is nonlinear.  
5.3 Case Study 
We have selected a case study of a cardiac pacemaker. This case study is 
described in chapter 4. 
5.3.1 FFA analysis  
Figure 5.8 shows system level scenario diagram for the AVI mode of operation. 
The system received Programmin_Command event from the programmer actor to 
operate in AVI mode. To monitor the heart, the system receives VSense event from the 
heart actor and handles it. The system begins pacing the heart by sending signals which 
are Pace event to the heart actor. Using the FFA with guide words as explained in section 
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Figure 5.9 Sequence diagram of the AVI scenario 
 
5.3.2 FMEA analysis  
In the sequence diagram of Figure 5.9, the VT component monitors the heart. 
When a heartbeat is not sensed, the AR component paces the heart and a refractory period 
is then in effect. Table 5-3 is the FMEA table for AR component. Applying FMEA on 
every component by tracing states and transitions for every component from its state 
diagram, we come up with the FMEA result. Table 5-3 is the result of FMEA for 
component AR. Also we apply FMEA for each connector by tracing all messages 
transmitted over the connector. Due to space limitations, we show the results concerning 
the AR component only. 
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5.3.3 FTA analysis  
Figure 5.10 shows a fault tree of top event “Commission” of “Pace” hazard as a 
function of components/connectors failure modes. FTA step 3 combines the results from 
FFA step 1 and FMEA step 2 to map the Commission “Pace“ hazard to its basic failure 
modes.  
 
Table 5-3 FMEA for AR component 
Component Failure Modes Effect on the system Cause of failure Cost of 
Failure $
AR ToOn Value Error The component will not 
work and there is no 
pace  
of the heart 
The component does not 
receive signal from CG 
1000 
- VR stuck in 
Refractory State 
The component will 
stay in Refractory state 
and there is no pace 
Connector VT-AR sends a 
wrong message, or component 
AR failes to understand the 
message. 
1000 
- The component 
receive GotVSense 
but there is no 
pace 
(Stuck in Waiting 
state) 
The component will 
stay in waiting state 
and there is no pace 
The component sensor does 
not work 
100000 
- Sense TimeOut 
Error 
The component in 
waiting state, heart 
operation is irregular 
because it receives no 
pacing 
The component sensor does 
not work or value of Sense 





in Pace state) 
Heart is always paced 
while patient condition 
requires only pacing 
the heart when no pulse 
is detected 
There is a problem in the 















No pace Start, 0.1
VRefract Error, 0.05
Got VSense Error, 0.1
Stuck in Refractory State, 0.05
Stuck in Waiting State, 0.05
Sense TimeOut Error, 0.1
Stuck in Refractory State, 0.05









Figure 5.10 Commission “Pace” Fault Tree 
Using the probabilities of the basic events which are determined in step 2, we 
estimate the probability of top level events.  
5.3.4  Component/Connector and scenario cost of failure graph 
The first level of the AR component cost of failure graph shown in Figure 5.11 is 
the top events of all fault trees with their probabilities. Every component/connector could 
contribute to these hazards during the execution of the scenario. The 
component/connector contribution to these hazards results from the component/connector 
failure modes. To estimate the cost of failure of component/connector during the scenario 
we develop the cost of failure graph which relates component/connector failure modes 
with the system level hazards. The probability of each failure mode is derived from 
domain knowledge and it could be annotated with the sequence diagram.  
Using equation (1) we could calculate the estimated cost of failure for every 
component/connector. The second level of the cost of failure graph Figure 5.11 is the 
failure modes of the AR component associated with the system level hazards (first level 
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of the graph). The third level of the graph is the consequence of every failure mode of the 
AR component represented by cost.  
System Level hazards 









AR “stuck in Refractory” State  




P(“Sense TimeOut Error”) = 0.1
PaceTimeOut Error
P(“PaceTimeOut Error”) = 0.03
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P(“stuck in Pace”) = 0.03
AR failed to handle ToOn
P(“failed to handle ToOn”)
=.09
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P(“Sense TimeOut” Error) = 0.1
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(Intensive Care)  
 
Figure 5.11 cost of failure graph of the AR component 
 
During the intended use of the AVI scenario there are several system level 
hazards. The output of the FFA is the list of these possible hazards. Every hazard is 
represented by a top event in a single fault tree. As shown in Figure 5.9 the AVI scenario 
is used to initialize the system through Programming_Command event (Programmer 
actor programs the pacemaker to work in AVI mode), monitor the heart through VScense 
event (pacemaker receive signal from Heart actor) and pacing the heart through Pace 
event (pacemaker pace the heart). The probability of usage of AVI scenario is given in 
chapter 4. Using this probability of usage with the results from step 1 (list of system level 
hazards, cost of hazards) and results from step 3 (probability of the system level hazards), 
we could estimate the cost of failure of the scenario. To implement this, we use the cost 
of failure graph in Figure 5.12 and equation (2). Based on equation (2) the estimated total 
cost of failure for the AVI scenario is 23205.8 $, similarly based on equation (1) the 
estimated total cost of failure of AR component is 12,184.3 $. 
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Estimated cost of failure
of AVI scenario
P(value error "Programming_Command" )
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Figure 5.12 Cost of failure graph of AVI scenario 
5.3.5 Components/Connectors and Scenario severity 
In the final step of the methodology we use a cost severity-graph (Figure 5.13) to 
determine the severity rank for each component/connector as well as the scenario. For the 
AVI scenario this is done by extending point A in y axis which gives the total cost of 
failure of the scenario, to meet the Cost-Severity curve at point B. We extend point B to 
meet the severity scale in the x axis at point C. Point C gives the severity value associated 
with the scenario failure. Table 5-4 shows the results of the final step of the methodology 




Figure 5.13 cost-severity graph 
 
Component/Connector Name Severity 
Connector CG-AR 0.50 
Connector CG-VT 0.50 
Connector AR-VT 0.94 
Connector VT-AR 0.95 
Component CG 0.50 
Component AR 0.96 
Component VT 0.95 
Table 5-4 Severity of each components/connectors in AVI scenario 
Next we map the estimated cost of failure of AVI scenario according to severity 
rank using a cost-severity graph. Table 5-5 shows the severity of AVI scenario. 
Scenario Severity 
AVI 0.96 




The results from Table 5-4 show that the VT and AR components are components 
with the highest severity rank in the AVI scenario. This result is intuitive since these two 
components are the most active and the most critical components that directly control the 
operation of the heart during the scenario. The CG component, on the other hand, 
controls the programming operation, and is monitored by the physician before the device 
is put into operation.  
Also from Table 5-4, we identify that the connection between the VT and AR 
components (AR-VT, VT-AR connectors) are the highest severity connectors. This result 
is also intuitive in the context of the pacemaker example, since these connectors deliver 
critical messages controlling the heart operation such as sensing and pacing.  
Results from Table 5-5 shows that the AVI scenario is a high severity scenario 
because it controls the pacing operation of the heart; the worst consequence of failure of 
this scenario could lead to patient’s death. Combining these results with the estimated 
probability of failure developed in [Katerina, 2003] for software architectural element 
(component/connector) as well as system scenario, we have developed an architectural 
level risk assessment methodology [Katerina, 2003]. Using the risk methodology, we 
could estimate the risk factor for every component/connector, scenario, use case and the 
whole software system. This architectural level risk assessment is explored in detail in 
[Katerina, 2003].  
We have used this methodology to estimate the severity for severity assessment in 
the performance risk assessment process measured in [Cortellessa, 2004]. This proposed 
methodology for severity assessment is used to assess the severity of software system 
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scenarios with requirement failure modes to estimate architectural level requirement risk 
assessment [Appukutty, 2005]. 
5.4 Conclusions and future work 
In summary, this research describes a methodology for estimating severity of each 
software architectural element (component/connector) at the software architectural level 
as well as severity of system scenarios. The methodology is based on dynamic UML 
specifications, taking into account the possibility of component/connector cost of failures. 
This methodology incorporates the cost of failure to severity rank mapping. FFA is used 
as a top down approach based on system scenarios to identify the system level failures, 
FMEA is used as a bottom up appraoch based on the detailed view of the system to 
identify the possible causes component/connector failures, and FTA correlates the results 
of FMEA and FFA. By annotating the hazard analysis results and the cost of failure 
information in the UML diagrams, this methodology of estimating severity can be 
automated in development environments supporting UML. We used the proposed 
methodology for the severity in estimating the performance-based and requirement-based 
risk factor of software systems [Appukutty, 2005] [Cortellessa, 2004]. 
In the future work we will apply this methodology to bigger NASA case studies to 
study the validity of this methodology. In the future work we would develop a tool 
support which will help domain expert to apply this methodology. 
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In this chapter, we explore the proposed architectural level risk assessment 
methodology for assessing risk of architectural element component/connector risk. The 
basis for the proposed risk assessment methodology is the use case and scenario diagrams 
of the system UML model. The use cases and scenarios of a UML specification model 
drive this methodology. We assume that the UML logical architectural model consists of 
a use case diagram defining several independent use cases (in future work, we will 
explore the dependent use cases), and that each use case is realized with one or more 
independent scenarios modeled using sequence diagrams. The proposed methodology 
identifies the potential risks in the software architecture, based on the early system 
specifications. The architectural specifications are the UML models that are available 
early in the software life cycle.  
Based on the risk definition [NASA3, 2000 the probability of software failure is 
explored in chapter 4. 
As shown in chapter 4 the estimation of the probability of failure of software 
component/connector is defined as the normalized dynamic metrics. Component 
probability of failure is the normalized dynamic complexity and the connector probability 
of failure is the normalized dynamic coupling [Katrina, 2003], [Hassan, 2001]. In chapter 
5 we showed how to assess the severity of failure for each component/connector in the 
software system [Hassan1, 2003], [Hassan2, 2003], [Hassan, 2005]. Combining the two 
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factors (probability of failure, severity of failure) we show in this chapter how we can 
estimate risk for software component/connector, scenarios, use cases and system. The 
estimation of these risk factors is based on the proposed risk assessment methodology. 
The proposed risk analysis methodology iterates on the use cases and the 
scenarios that realize each use case and determines the component/connector risk factors 
for each scenario, as well as the scenarios and use cases risk factors. For each scenario, 
the component/connector risk factors are estimated as a product of the dynamic 
complexity behavioral specification measured from the UML sequence diagrams (see 
chapter 4) and the severity level is estimated using hazard analysis and cost of failure (see 
chapter 5). Then, a Markov model [Ajith, 2004] is constructed for each scenario to 
determine a scenario risk factor. Further, the use cases and overall system risk factors are 
estimated. The outcome of this process is a list of critical scenarios in each use case, a list 
of critical use cases, and a list of critical components/connectors for each scenario and 
each use case. Also we estimate the system level risk factor.  
We proceed in this chapter as follows: Section 6.2 is the proposed risk assessment 
methodology, Section 6.3 component/connector risk factor, Section 6.4 describes the 
scenario level risk factor model, use case and system level risk factor are described in 
Section 6.5, Section 6.6 is the case study, sensitivity analysis is explored in Section 6.7 and 
the chapter summary at Section 6.8. 
6.2 Risk Assessment Methodology 
The proposed methodology is modeled using UML as shown in figure 6.1. Figure 
6.1 describes the use case model of the risk assessment methodology. To automate this 
risk assessment methodology the UML model is implemented as a prototype tool and is 
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described in chapter 8 [Wang, 2003]. The use case model of the proposed methodology is 
described as follows:  
 
Figure 6.1 Overall Use Case UML model of the proposed methodology 
The whole process begins with step 1 which consists of collecting information from 
UML visual model; this step is explored in details in chapter 8 and the process continues as 
described below. Step 2 is explored in chapter 4, step 3 is explored in chapter 5, and the 
other steps are explored in this chapter. 
 
1. Collect the information of the software system from UML model (see chapter 
8) [Wang, 2003], 
2. Estimate dynamic metrics [Hassan, 2001] for each component and connecter of 
the software system for a given scenario in a given use case (see chapter 4), 
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3. Conduct severity analysis for the software system for a given scenario in a 
given use case (see chapter 5) [Hassan1, 2003], [Hassan2, 2003] [Hassan, 
2005], 
4. Calculate a heuristic risk factor [Ammar, 1997] for each component and 
connecter in the software architecture for a given scenario in a given use case 
(see section 6.3),  
5. Conduct risk factor for each scenario in a given use case based on 
component/connector risk factor (see section 6.4) using Markov model 
[Katerina, 2003]. 
6. Conduct risk factor for a each use case in the system based on scenario risk 
factor and conduct risk factor for the overall system based on each use case risk 
factor (see section 6.5),  
 
The core of the proposed methodology [Katerina, 2003] is defined by the following 
algorithm steps:  
 
For each use case 
          For each scenario 
                    For each component 
                             Measure dynamic complexity 
                            Assign severity based on cost of failure  and hazard analysis 
                           Calculate component’s risk factor 
                   For each connector 
                          Measure dynamic coupling 
                         Assign severity based on  hazard analysis 
                        Calculate connector’s risk factor 
                 Generate critical component/connector list  
                 Construct Markov model & Calculate transition probabilities 
                 Calculate scenario’s risk factor 
            Rank the scenarios based on risk factors, Determine critical scenarios list  
            Calculate use case risk factor 
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           Rank use cases based on risk factors, Determine critical use case list  
Calculate overall system risk factor  
 
The methodology is a top down approach and it is iterative over each level of the 
software architecture, starting from use case level, to scenario level and down to basic 
component/connector level. The process starts from a use case level, iterates through each 
use case and each scenario of that use case. From the scenario level, each component and 
connector is analyzed and the corresponding risk factors are estimated. The 
component/connector risk factor is the product of the normalized dynamic metrics (see 
chapter 4) and the severity of the failure of that component/connector (see chapter 5). The 
scenario risk factor is estimated based on the Markov model which is described in [Ajith, 
2004]. Use case and system level risk factors are estimated as shown in section 6.5 taking 
into consideration the assumption that use cases are independent. 
6.3 Component/Connector Risk Factor 
Components and connectors are the building blocks of any software architecture. 
Hence the architectural risk factor is dependent on the risk factors of the 
components/connectors. The assessment of component/connector risk factors is based on 
the dynamic UML specifications; these risk factors are referred to as the dynamic 
heuristic risk factors [Katerina, 2003], [Ammar, 1997].  
The risk factor of component/connector is the product of the probability of failure 
of each component/connector and the severity of these failures. The probability of failure 
of component/connector is estimated based on dynamic UML specifications (see chapter 
4), and the severity of failure is estimated based on hazard analysis techniques and cost of 
that failure (see chapter 5).  
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6.3.1 Component Risk Factor 
For each scenario xS , we calculate heuristic risk factors for each component 
participating in the scenario based on the dynamic complexity and severity level. Note 
that in general, these values will be different for different scenarios. The risk factor xirf  






i svtDOCrf *=                                                      6.1 
where xiDOC  (0 ≤ 
x
iDOC  ≤ 1) is the normalized complexity of the 
thi  component in the 
scenario xS  (chapter 4), and 
x
isvt  (0 ≤ 
x
isvt  < 1) is the severity level for the 
thi  
component in the scenario xS (chapter 5). 
6.3.2 Connector Risk Factor 
The risk factor xijrf  for a connector between components i  and j  in the scenario 






ij svtEOCrf ⋅=                                                          6.2 
where xijEOC  (0 ≤ 
x
ijEOC  ≤ 1) is the normalized coupling for the connector 
between thi  and thj components in the scenario xS (chapter 4), and 
x
ijsvt  (0 ≤ 
x
ijsvt  < 1) is 
the severity level for the connector between the thi  and the thj components in the 
scenario xS  (chapter 5). 
6.4 Scenarios Risk Factor 
This step of the methodology has been presented here for the sake of completeness 




We use an analytical modeling approach to derive the risk factor of each scenario. 
For this purpose, we generalize the state-based modeling approach previously used for 
architecture-based software reliability estimation [Katerina, 2001]. Thus, the software 
reliability model first published in [Cheung, 1980] considers only component failures. In 
the scenario risk model, we account for both component and connector failures, that is, 
we consider both component and connector risk factors. In addition, instead of a single 
failure state for the scenario, we consider multiple failure states that represent failure 
modes with different severity. This approach allows us to derive not only the overall 
scenario risk factor, but also its distribution over different severity classes, which provide 
additional insights important for risk analysis.  
For example, the two scenarios may have close values of scenario risk factor with 
significantly different distributions among severity classes. It can then be inferred that the 
scenario with a risk factor distributed among more severe failure classes (e.g., critical and 
catastrophic) deserves more attention than the other scenario. 
The scenario risk model is developed in two steps. The first step is to build a 
control flow graph, which is a direct translation of the scenario diagram. This control 
flow graph is constructed using the UML sequence diagrams and describes software 
execution behavior with respect to the manner in which different components interact to 
achieve the scenario mission. It is assumed that a control flow graph has a single entry (S) 
and a single exit node (T) representing the beginning and the termination of the 
execution, respectively. 
The second step is to build the scenario risk model for that control flow graph, 
which is based on the DTMC. The derivation of the DTMC from the control flow graph 
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using the UML sequence diagram is the main step in deriving the k-step transition 
probability for the absorbing states steady states of the reliability model (for each 
sequence diagram) [Ajith, 2004]. The states in the control flow graph represent active 
components, while the arcs represent the transfer of control between components (i.e. 
connectors). It is further assumed that the transfer of control between components has a 
Markov property meaning that, given the knowledge of the component in control at any 
given time, the future behavior of the system is conditionally independent of the past 
behavior. This assumption allows us to model software execution behavior for scenario 
xS  with an absorbing Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC) with a transition probability 
matrix  
][ xij
x PP = ,                                                    6.3 
where xijP  is interpreted as the conditional probability that the program will next 
execute component j , given that it has just completed the execution of the component i . 
After building the risk model, we solve the Markov chain to estimate scenario risk factor 
and risk factor distribution of this scenario.  
6.5 Use Cases and Overall System Risk Factors  
The risk factor krf of each use case kU  is obtained by averaging the risk factors 
of all scenarios xS








k Prfrf *                                  6.4 
where  xrf  is the risk factor of scenario xS
  in use case kU  and xkp
 is the probability of 
occurrence of scenario xS
  in the use case kU .  
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Prfrf *                                         6.5 
where krf  and kp  are the risk factor and probability of occurrence of the use 
case kU . It is obvious from equations (4) and (5) that the use cases and overall system 
risk factors depend on the probabilities of scenarios occurrence xkP  in the use case kU  and 
the probability of use case occurrence kP . Hence, scenarios (use cases) with high risk 
factors but very low probability of occurrence will not contribute significantly to the 
overall system risk factor.  
6.6 Case study  
We have selected a case study of a cardiac pacemaker device to illustrate how our 
proposed methodology works. A cardiac pacemaker is an implanted device that assists 
cardiac functions when the underlying pathologies lower intrinsic heartbeats low 
[Douglass, 1998]. An error in the software operation of the device can cause loss of a 
patient’s life. This is an example of a critical real-time application. We use the UML real-
time notion to model the pacemaker.  The detailed description and UML model of 
pacemaker is obtained in chapter 7. 
6.6.1 Components and Connector Risk Factor 
For this case study, only one scenario was available for each use case. However, 
the proposed methodology is more general and supports multiple scenarios defined for 
each use case. We will also apply the methodology on HCS case study (see chapter 7) 
which supports multiple scenarios for each use case. 
 
 80
Figure 6.2 shows the sequence diagram of a programming scenario. In this 
scenario, the programmer interacts with the RS and CD components to input a set of 8 bits 
specifying an operation mode for the pacemaker. This byte is received by the CG 
component, which, in turn, sets the operation mode of the AR and VT components to one 
of five modes of operation.  The other scenarios are shown in chapter 7. Using equations 









A beneficial outcome of our risk assessment methodology is the ability to identify 
a set of most critical components. Figure 6.1, 6.2 presents risk factors of all 
components/connectors for different scenarios of the pacemaker case study. In these 
figures, the different severity levels are presented by different shades. It is obvious that 
VT and AR are the most critical components in the pacemaker case study since they have 
high risk factors with catastrophic severity in multiple scenarios. A similar approach can 
be used to identify the set of most critical connectors. It is also obvious from Figure 6.4 
that connector VT-AR is the most critical connector in this case study since it has a high 
risk factor with catastrophic severity. 
 Component risk factor 
  RS CD CG AR VT 
Programming 0.05 0.125 0.15 0 0 
AVI 0 0 0.00016 0.300675 0.3309515 
AAI 0 0 0.00045 0.94905 0 
VVI 0 0 0.00045 0 0.94905 







VVT 0 0 0.00025 0 0.949525 



























































Figure 6.3 The 3-D bar graph of risk factors of the components Vs. scenarios of the 
cardiac pacemaker. 
 
Scenario name   
Programming AVI AAI VVI AAT VVT 
RS-CD 0.03125      
RS-CG 0.03125      
CD-CG 0.09375      
CG-CD 0.09375      
CG-AR  0.000195 0.5  0.5  
CG-VT  0.000195   0.5  0.5 









AR-VT  0.09215     
























































































Figure 6.4 The 3-D bar graph of risk factors of the connectors vs. scenarios of the cardiac 
pacemaker. 
 
Figure 6.4 shows a 3-D bar graph of the risk factors of the connectors, 
corresponding to their scenarios shaded according to their severity. This is one way of 
clearly identifying the most risky components/connectors - the component/connector with 
tall bars is the most risky. Another way is to rank the components/connectors according 
to their risk factors and severity.  
From Figure 6.4, we identify that the connection between the VT, AR components 
are the highest risk connectors. This result is intuitively correct in the context of the 
pacemaker example since these connectors deliver critical messages controlling heart 
operation, such as sensing and pacing. 
6.6.2 Scenario Level Risk Factor 
We have developed scenario risk models for all scenarios of the pacemaker 
example (programming, AVI, AAI, VVI, AAT, and VVT). We will explore in some detail 
the AVI scenario. Figure 6.5 shows AVI scenario under the AVI use case. In this scenario, 
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the VT component keeps sensing the heart and the AR component paces the heart 
whenever a heart beat is not sensed. As in all scenarios, a refractory period is then in 
effect after every pace.  
 




6.6.3 Building the Control Flow Graph from Sequence Diagram 
 
The difference between the sequence diagram and the control flow graph is that 
the control flow graph has a single macro state for a component, while in the sequence 
diagram we have different active states of a component represented along the 
component's object life time. Thus the states in a control flow graph represent the active 
components (or, to be more precise, the corresponding active state of that component, 
hidden in the representation). The arcs connecting the components (i.e. connectors) 
represent a transfer of control between these components. Figure 6.5 shows a sequence 
diagram from the AVI scenario of a cardiac pace maker system. The sequence diagram 
consists of three main components - Communications Gnome (CG), programmed by the 
user to set a particular mode of system operation (in this case AVI mode), Atrial 
component (AR) and Ventricular component (VT) (which sense/pace the heart depending 
on the mode of operation). The heart shown in the sequence diagram is an external actor, 
which is sensed and paced by the pace maker system. The states of the AR and the VT 
components - idle, refracting, waiting, pacing are shown along the object life lines. Now 
this sequence diagram is converted to a control flow graph Figure 6.6. After obtaining the 
control flow graph, we add the probabilities for control transfers from a component to 
another (represented as a number along the corresponding connector). These probabilities 
correspond to the transition probabilities of the xP  matrix. This gives the DTMC of the 
software execution behavior for that scenario. Figure 6.6 shows the DTMC built for the 
AVI scenario shown in Figure 6.5. It has a single entry state (state S), which is the dummy 
start state. An assumption here is that the control transfer between any of the states has 
the Markov property: given the knowledge of the component in control at any given time 
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the future behavior of the system (or in other words the next transition) is conditionally 
independent of the past behavior. We now assign the basic transition probabilities of the 
control transfer from component to component, denoted by xP  (equation 3) for scenario 
Sx [Ajith, 2004]. The matrix Figure 6.7 shows the transition probability matrix PAV I   for 
the AVI scenario. 
 
 
Figure 6.6: DTMC for the software execution behavior of the AVI scenario. 
 
 
Figure 6.7 Transition probability metrics I   for the AVI scenario 
6.6.4 Building the Risk Model 
Instead of a single failure state considered in all existing architecture-based 
software reliability models presented in [Katerina, 2001], we consider multiple failure 
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states that represent failure modes with different severities. Since severity plays an 
important role in risk assessment, we added 4 failure states corresponding to the 4 failure 
modes with different severity (see chapter 5). From our severity analysis we have came 
up with four classes of severity. Thus, we have n + 1 transient states (n components and 
the dummy start state S) and have five absorbing states (i.e. four failure states and one 
normal terminating state T). There could be a failure transition from a 
component/connector to the failure absorbing state (Figure 6.7) depending on the severity 
of the failure of that component/connector. If there is no failure throughout the execution 
of the scenario, the control reaches the normal absorbing state (the T state). The failure 
states in our methodology are Minor, Marginal, Critical and Catastrophic (see chapter 5).  
 
Figure 6.8 DTMC model for AVI scenario 
6.6.5 Solving the Markov Chain 
Dotted lines show the failure states of the scenario. Since the severity associated 
with component AR and the connector (AR - V T) is the same (Catastrophic), there is only 
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one dotted line to represent the failure transition from the AR representing the failures of 
component and connector (shown in Figure 6.8. The detailed calculation of the normal 
and failure transitions is presented in [Ajith, 2004]. After calculating the transition 
probabilities for all components and connectors we solve the risk model of the AVI 
scenario shown in Figure 6.8.  
The important advantage of this risk assessment methodology is that the risk 
factor of the scenario is given as four factors, one for each class of severity. Since 
severity plays an important role in risk assessment, this concept of the severity specific 
risk factor provides vital meaning of the risk factor rather than a single number. Since the 
risk factor (0.7744) of the AVI scenario is distributed as 0, 0.0004, 0 and 0.7740 -
corresponding to minor, marginal, critical and catastrophic - we know that most of the 
AVI scenario risk factor(99.94%) is catastrophic, which is more severe than the risk factor 
0.9745 distributed as 0, 0.5002, 0 and 0.4743, which has catastrophic risk(only 48.67%). 
We have developed and solve scenario risk models for all scenarios of the 
pacemaker example (programming, AVI, AAI, VVI, AAT, and VVT). Table 6.3 shows how 
the risk factor of each scenario is distributed among the severity classes, as well as the 
overall scenario risk factors. Figure 6.9 presents graphically the information given. The 
bar’s shade represents the severity class and the z-axis represents the value of the risk 






Scenario Name   
  
Programming AVI AAI VVI AAT VVT 
Minor 0.3196 0 0 0 0 0 
Marginal 0.1782 0.0004 0.5002 0.5002 0.5001 0.5001








Catastrophic 0 0.7740 0.4743 0.4743 0.4747 0.4747
 Scenario risk factors 0.4951 0.7744 0.9745 0.9745 0.9748 0.9748
Table 6.3. Distribution of the scenarios risk factors among severity classes. 
 
Table 6.3 shows the risk distribution of the scenarios among the four severity 
classes. The columns in the table represent the scenarios and the rows represent the 
severity classes. A value in the cell risk m,n  where n is the row and m is the column gives 
us the risk factor of the scenario m with the severity n. Similarly Figure 6.9 shows a 3-D 
bar graph of the scenario risk factors versus the four severity classes. The graph is shaded 
according to the distribution of the scenario risk factors among the severity classes (as 
shown in the legend). As we can see, the AVI scenario has a high catastrophic risk value. 












































Figure 6.9 Distribution of the scenarios risk factors among severity classes. 
 
Several observations are made from Figure 6.9. First, all scenarios from the 
operational mode have higher risk factors than the programming scenario, which is used 
just to set the mode of the pacemaker. Next, it is obvious that knowledge of the 
distribution of scenarios risk factors among severity classes provides valuable 
information for the risk analysts in addition to the overall scenario risk factor. Thus, the 
AVI scenario has the smallest scenario risk factor (0.7744) among the operational 
scenarios (AVI, AAI, VVI, AAT, and VVT). However, most of the AVI scenario risk factor 
belongs to the catastrophic severity class (0.7740), that is, the AVI scenario has the 
highest value of the risk factor in the catastrophic severity class. The risk factors of the 
other operational scenarios are distributed almost equally among the marginal and 
catastrophic severity classes with the values in catastrophic class significantly smaller 
than for the AVI scenario. Programming scenario has the smallest overall scenario risk 
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factor (0.4951) distributed only among minor and marginal severity classes, which 
means that it is the less critical scenario in the pacemaker case study.  
6.6.6 Use case and overall system risk factor 
Since in the pacemaker example we considered one scenario per use case, the use 
case risk factors are identical to the scenarios risk factors. For the pacemaker example, 
according to [Douglass, 1998] the inhibit modes are more frequently used than the 
triggered mode. Also, the programming mode is executed significantly less frequently 
than the regular usage of the pacemaker in any of its operational modes. Hence, we 
assume the probabilities for programming use case and five operational use cases (AVI, 
AAI, AAT, VVI, and VVT) (see chapter 7). 
Using equations 6.4 and 6.5 and the use case probabilities shown in chapter 7, we 
estimate the overall risk factor of the pacemaker 0.9118. The distribution of the overall 
system risk factor among severity classes is presented in Table 6.4 and Figure 6.10. The 
Table shows the distribution of the system risk factor among the four severity classes and 
Figure 6.10 shows the 3d bar cardiac pacemaker system risk distribution among the 
severity classes. As we can see most of the cardiac pacemaker system's risk falls in to the 
catastrophic severity class. We see that the system risk factor is mostly distributed among 
marginal and catastrophic severity class. Moreover, the catastrophic severity class is the 
dominant class for this system.   
 Minor Marginal Critical Catastrophic 
Overall system risk 
factor  0.0032 0.3520 0 0.5566 




















Figure 6.10 the system risk 3d bar distribution of the cardiac pacemaker. 
6.7 Sensitivity Analysis 
In the proposed methodology, we use an analytical approach and derive close 
form solutions. One of the advantages of this approach is that sensitivity analysis can be 
performed simply by plugging in different risk factor values for the 
components/connectors in the close form solutions, which is faster and more effective 
than reapplying the algorithmic solution for each set of different parameters as in 
[Yacoub, 2002]. Next, we illustrate the sensitivity of the scenarios and overall system risk 
factors to components/connectors risk factors. 
Figure 6.11 illustrates the variation of the risk factor of the AVI scenario as a 
function of changes in risk factors of components active in that scenario. The variation of 
the risk factor of VT component introduces the biggest variation of the AVI scenario risk 
factor (from 0.65 to 1). This is the case because the VT component is the most active 
component in this scenario to sense the heart pulse. On the other side, the variations of 
the risk factor of the AR and CG components have less of an effect on the range of the 
variation the AVI scenario risk factor. However, the AR component is also critical since it 
results in the smaller value of the scenario’s risk factor. Figure 6.13 shows the sensitivity 
of the risk factor of the programming scenario to the risk factors of the components active 
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in that scenario. In this case, the variation of the risk factor of the CG component 
introduces the biggest variation of the programming scenario risk factor (from 0.175 to 
0.979). The variation of the overall system risk factor as a function of components risk 
factors is presented in Figure 6.14. It is clear that the risk factors of components CG, VT, 
and AR are more likely to affect the overall system risk. This is due to the fact that these 
components are active in scenarios that have high execution probabilities. Furthermore, 
the variation of the risk factors of components that are active only in the programming 
scenario (i.e. RS and CD) has almost no influence on the variation of the overall system 
risk factor because the execution probability of the programming scenario is lower than 
the execution probabilities of other scenarios. Figure 6.11 and Figure 6.12 show the 
variation of the AVI scenario risk factors and as a function of components and connectors 
risk factors. It is obvious that both AVI scenario risk factor and the overall system risk 
factor are the most sensitive to the risk factor of the CG-VT connector. 
 





Figure 6.12 Sensitivity of the AVI risk factor to the risk factors of the connectors 
 






Figure 6.14 Sensitivity of the overall system risk factor to the risk factors of the 
components 
 
Figure 6.15 Sensitivity of the overall risk factor to the risk factors of the connectors 
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6.8 Conclusion and Future Work 
This chapter presents the architectural-level reliability-based risk assessment 
methodology [Katerina, 2003]. In this chapter, we propose a methodology for risk 
assessment based on the UML specifications such as use cases and sequence diagrams 
that can be used in the early phases the software life cycle. Our methodology uses 
dynamic complexity and dynamic coupling metrics obtained from the UML 
specifications [Hassan, 2001]. The risk assessment methodology presented in this chapter 
considers both component and connector risk factors. It is used for calculating the risk 
factors of various components and connectors and estimating a risk factor of scenarios, 
use case and system level. We combine severity [Hassan1, 2003], [Hassan2, 2003], 
[Hassan, 2005] and complexity (and coupling) metrics to obtain risk factors for the 
components (and connectors).  It aggregates the risk factors of components/connectors to 
calculate risk factors of scenarios among the various severity classes by solving the 
Markov chain. Using the scenarios probabilities, the use case risk factors could be 
estimated. The system-level risk factor is calculated by averaging the use case risk factors 
with their execution probabilities. The risk methodology is applied to the cardiac 
pacemaker case study; we have also applied it to the HCS case study (see chapter 7). 
Since the methodology is entirely analytical and provides a closed form solution, it is 
very suitable for sensitivity analysis and automation. In fact, a prototype of the risk 
assessment tool written in JAVA which reads the embedded UML information from 
Rational Rose, and calculates the various risk factors has already been developed (see 
chapter 9) [Wang, 2003]. 
In summary our methodology consists of the following:  
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(1) Accurate and more efficient methods to estimate risk factors on different levels and  
(2) Additional information useful for risk analysis. 
(3) Estimation of overall system risk factor 
(4) Estimation of scenarios and use cases risk factors which enable us to focus on the 
high-risk scenarios and uses cases even though they may be rarely used and therefore not 
contributing significantly to the overall system risk factor.  
(5) Estimation of the distribution of the scenarios/use cases/system risk factors over 
different severity classes which allow us to make a list of critical scenarios in each use 
case, as well as a list of critical use cases in the system.  
(6) Finally, we identify a list of critical components and connectors that has high risk 
values in high severity classes. 
Our future work is focused on generalization of the methodology presented in this 
chapter. We will consider different kinds of dependencies that might be present in the 
UML use case diagrams (i.e considers the various relationships between the use cases) 
and the way to derive their risk factors. Another direction of our future research is the 
development of performance, maintainability based risk assessment methodology. 
 
 99




7.1 Command and Control System (CCS) 
The case study we use to applay our methodology is a large command and control 
system that is used in a life-critical, mission-critical application. This system was 
modeled using the Rational Rose Realtime CASE tool [Rose, 2001]. The CCS is a 
Computer Software Configuration Item (CSCI) that provides the following functions: 
This CCS system is a complex system with operations setting controller, fault recovery 
procedures, and pump control functionalities. The CCS is responsible for providing 
overall management of pumps as well as performing the necessary monitoring and 
response to sensors data. Also, it is responsible for performing automated startup, and 
controlling Thermal System reconfigurations. During each execution cycle, a check is 
performed for incoming commands. Received commands are validated in the same 
execution cycle. Mode change commands, which will reconfigure the Internal Thermal 
System, are also accepted from other components of CCS to compensate for system 
component failures or coolant leaks. A failure recovery system detects failure conditions 
and performs recovery operations in response to the detected failures. Failure conditions 
include combinations of Pump failures and Shutoff Valve failures. The system has a 
hierarchical architecture. The top-level software architecture of this system is shown in 

































Figure 7.1 use case diagram of the CCS 
Every use case is mapped to one scenario. Table 7.1 shows the probability of 
execution of each scenario.  











Table 7-1 The probabilities of the scenarios of the CCS 
 
Figure 7.2 shows the Dua sequence diagram. This sequence diagram is an 















state_Idle state_Stand_By State_X State_X State_X State_XProcessing_Cycle
ITCS_Command
1: NotAvailable : _1HZ_Processing (void)
2: NotAvailable : Get_Function_Command (void)
Trans_To_Dua Processing_Cycle
Non_ITCS_Commad3: NotAvailable : Startup (void)
4: NotAvailable : Armed_PFMC_New_Motor_Speed (int 1...)
5: NotAvailable : Startup (void)
6: NotAvailable : Armed_PFMC_New_Motor_Speed (int 1...)
Trans_TO_Dua
5: NotAvailable : PPA_Speed_Feedback (int 0)
6: NotAvailable : Open_Shut_Off_Valve (void)
trans_TO_Dual
7: NotAvailable : PPA_Speed_Feedback (int 0)
8: NotAvailable : Open_Shut_Off_Valve (void)
Trans_TO_Dual
7: NotAvailable : Valve_Open (void)
8: NotAvailable : Armed_PFMC_New_Motor_Speed (int 2...)
Open
Trans_TO_Dual
9: NotAvailable : Valve_Open (void)
Open10: NotAvailable : Armed_PFMC_New_Motor_Speed (int 2...)
Trans_TO_Dual
9: NotAvailable : PPA_Speed_Feedback (int 1)
Dual_Tans Operating
11: NotAvailable : PPA_Speed_Feedback (int 1)
12: NotAvailable : SFCA_Clear_Inhibi t (void)
Operating




2: NotAvailable : _1HZ_Processing (void)
3: NotAvailable : Trans_Dual (int 3)
Dua_ModeDual
 





Table 7-2 shows the risk factor and severity of each component in the Dau 
scenario. From this table we can identify that component pFMC_LTR1 is the most sever 
component  
 
scenario component complexityseverityRisk Factor 
fRITCSR1 0.0625 0.75 0.046875 





sCITCSR1 0.375 0.95 0.35625 
n3_2_Data_AccessR1 0.0625 0.5 0.03125 
n3_1_Data_AccessR1 0.0625 0.75 0.046875 
pFMC_LTR1 0.125 0.75 0.09375 
Dua 
schedularR1 0.125 0.25 0.03125 
 
Table 7-2 Dua Scenario components risk factor 
 
The other sequences diagrams of this case study and the detailed results are 
shown in Appendix B. 
7.1.1 CCS Scenarios risk factors 
 
 Table 7-3 shows the distribution of risk factor of the scenarios among severity 
classes. 
 
 Minor Marginal Critical Catastrophic Risk Factor 
S_LT  00.0014230.224649 0.084604 0.310676 
D_LT  0.095979 0 0.06582 0.31299 0.474789 
MT  00.0203620.208994 0.386209 0.615565 
S_MT 0 0.002180.143619 0.501907 0.647706 
D_MT  0.025382 00.413158 0.000468 0.439008 
R_B_P 0.190150.043739 0 0.039977 0.273866 
Dua 00.1402220.000542 0.35643 0.497194 
LT 0.2862450.055764 0 0 0.342009 
Single_LT 00.0014230.224649 0.084604 0.310676 
Monitor   0.341113 0.201009 0.542122 




Table 7-3 shows that scenario S_MT has total risk factor 0.647706 and it has 











































Figure 7.3 the 3D-bar graph for the distribution of scenarios risk factor among severity 
classes. 
 
7.1.2 CCS System Risk Factor 
Table 7-4 shows the distribution of the system risk factor between the four 
severity classes. It shows also from Figure 7.4 that the risk of failure of the system is 
critical. The system has 0.537867 total risk factor and most of this risk factor is critical 
which is 0.326638. 
 Minor Marginal Critical CatastrophicRisk Factor 
System 0.005978 0.002651 0.326638 0.2026 0.537867 
 








In this section and also in the section 7.3 we show the results of applying the 
severity analysis methodology on other case studies. 
7.2 Remote Transmission System (RTS) 
The RTS involves a controller and a remote system. The controller sends 
commands and receives data from the remote system. Transmission takes place in two 
different modes. Figure 7.5 shows the Use case view of the system. The actor “Operator” 
represents the operator of the controller. The Remote system is shown as an actor as well. 
The two different transmission modes are represented as use cases “TransmitA” and 
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Figure 7.5 Use case diagram for RTS case study 
 
Figure 7.6 gives the system level sequence diagram for one of the scenarios of 
“TransmitB” use case. Ac1 is an external actor that stores the current status of the remote 
system. Based on the status, a command is sent to the remote system. S1, S2 and S3 












Figure 7.6 System level sequence diagram of TransmitB use case 
 
The following table shows the list of events (signals/messages) sent between the 
System and the external actors. The FFA guidewords are applied to these external events. 
Since we only consider the performance related failures [Cortellessa, 2005], we apply 
only the “LATE” guideword. The FFA table obtained is shown in Table 7-6. 
Event NameActor sends or receives this event
Status From A1 to system 
Transmit From system to Remote System 









Event Guide-word Failure Effect Cost Severity
Status Late A1 takes longer time 
to send the status 
The input cannot be 




Transmit Late Commands don’t 
reach the remote 
system at proper time
Commands cannot be 





Table 7-6 FFA Table for TransmitB scenario 
 
This results show the severity analysis for the system scenario level. 
7.3 E-Commerce system 
The e-commerce application allows customers and suppliers to interact with each 
other over the Internet. In this type of applications long response times may easily lead 
customer to change the supplier, with consequent damages such as loss of money and 
market. The severity of performance failures (i.e., violations of performance 
requirements) depends on the type of failure and usually is different for different types of 
failures.  
The e-commerce system allows a customer to browse through the various catalogs 
provided by the suppliers, select the item to be purchased, and place the order. The order 
is validated by checking that the customer has a contract with the supplier and one or 
more bank accounts through which payments can be made. The supplier checks for the 
availability of the product, and if available, ships the product. After received the product, 
the customer sends back an acknowledgement. Finally, the invoice is processed by 
electronically transferring funds from the customer’s bank account to the supplier’s bank 
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Figure 7.7 Use case view of e-commerce system 
 
For illustration purposes, we consider the Place Requisition scenario, where the 
customer places an order and receives a receipt of the order. The Sequence diagram is 






































Figure 7.8 Sequence Diagram for the Place Requisition scenario 
 
The system level sequence diagram is shown in Figure 7.8. It shows the messages 
that are exchanged between the system and the external actors involved. The FFA 
guidewords are applied to these external events Figure 7.9. Since we consider only the 











Figure 7.9 System level sequence diagram for Place Requisition scenario 
 
 
After we apply the FFA we come up with the FFA Table 7-7, which show the 
severity of failure of the scenario [Cortellessa, 2005] Figure 7.9. 
 
Scenario Event Guide 
words 


















message for the 
order placed takes 
a long time to be 






















Table 7-7 FFA Table for Place Requisition scenario 
 
This table shows the results of applying the severity methodology for system 
scenario level and the table shows the FFA output. 
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In this chapter we explore two ways to validate the proposed risk methodology 
and the proposed severity assessment methodology. First we use validation criteria 
similar to criteria explored in [Elemam, 2000] (section 8.2). Second we compare the 
results of risk factors predicted using the proposed methodology and risk factors resulted 
from the simulation model [Yacoub, 2002] and we looking for correlation (Section 8.3). 
And in section 8.4 we validate the severity analysis methodology using the validation 
criteria proposed in section 8.2. 
We proceed in this chapter as follows: Section 8.1 introduction, Section 8.2 is the 
proposed validation criteria, Section 8.3 is validation by comparison, and Section 8.4 is 
the proposed severity methodology validation. We conclude with Section 8.5. 
8.2 Validation criterion 
To validate the proposed risk model, we use criteria that are based on the analysis 
of categorical data [Kohavi, 1998], [Briand, 2000], [Lanubile, 1997]. In our validation, 
we assume that we have two variables, real risk and predicted risk, with only two discrete 
values, low and high risk. We restrict ourselves to binary risk classes: High and Low. 
Thus the data can be represented by a two-dimensional table, shown in Table 8.1, with 
one row for each level of the variable real risk and one column for each level of the 




8.2 1 Confusion matrix 
A commonly used notation for presenting risk data for evaluation is the Confusion 
matrix, Table 8.1 [Kohavi, 1998], [Briand, 2000]. This matrix contains information about 
actual risk done by the simulation model and predicted risk done by the proposed model. 
Such a confusion matrix also appears frequently in the medical sciences in the context of 
evaluating diagnostic tests; for example, see [Gordis, 1996].  
The data can be represented by a two-dimensional table [Elemam, 2000] Table 8-
1. With rows for real risk (low, high) and columns for predicted risk (low, high). In our 
context, the first row contains low risk components, while the second row contains high 
risk components. The first column contains components that the models classify as low 
















Table 8-1 Confusion matrix. 
 
8.2.2 Definition of the terms used in the confusion matrix 
11n          The number of components which have low risk factor; it is predicted as having 
low risk factor. 
12n          The number of components which have low risk factor; it is predicted as having 
high risk factor. 
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21n          The number of components which have high risk factor; it is predicted as having 
low risk factor. 
22n         The number of components which have high risk factor; it is predicted as having 
high risk factor. 
1N +         Number of low risk factor components. 
2N +         Number of high risk factor components. 
1N+         The number of components predicted as Low risk 
2N+         The number of components predicted as High risk  
The number of all components is  
                       1 2N N N+ += + = 1N+  + 2N+                                                          8.1 
Having data represented by a confusion matrix, we could measure the validity of 
the proposed model. To study the predictive validity of the proposed model we use the 
evaluation criteria explained in the following section. 
A number of different measures are used to evaluate binary classifiers in software 
engineering research [Almeida, 1998], [Lanubile, 1997]. An intuitively obvious way to 
evaluate the overall “goodness” of a classifier is to calculate the proportion of correct 
classifications. The proportion correct has been used in a number of previous studies to 
evaluate classifiers [Elemam, 2000], [Almeida, 1998], [Lanubile, 1997], [Schneidewind, 
1994]. The misclassification rate quality achieved [Lanubile, 1997] is also used in 
engineering research as a criteria for evaluating predictive models. Different authors use 
different measures; they also often report multiple measures in a single study [Elemam, 
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2001b]. We recommend the use of multiple measures for a single study as it may be 
useful for getting an overall intuitive picture of prediction performance. 
In the following section, we will explain the proposed criteria that could be used 
to evaluate the proposed risk model. 
8.2.3 Proportion correct 
Most authors proposed the proportion correct value, for example [Almeida, 1998], 
[Lanubile, 1997], [Schneidewind, 1994]. Porter in [Porter, 1993], called the proportion 
correct value as “correctness value”. This is an intuitively interesting measure of 




=                                               8.2 
It gives the ratio of components that the model correctly predicts. 
8.2.4 Misclassification rate 
This evaluative measure is used in a number of different studies, such as 
[Khoshgoftaar, 1995a], [ [Koshgoftaar, 1996b], [Elemam, 2001b], [Khoshgoftaar, 1997].  
Two types of errors could take place using binary classifiers. A Type 1 error is made 
when a high risk component is classified as low risk, while a Type 2 is made when a low 
risk component is classified as high risk. It is desirable to have both types of error be 
small. However, since the two types of errors are not independent, software engineering 
managers should consider their different implications. As a result of a Type 1 error, an 
actual high risk component could pass quality control. This would cause the release of a 
lower quality product and more fix effort when a failure takes place. As a result of a Type 
2 error, an actual low risk component will receive more testing and inspection effort than 
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needed. Type 1 and Type 2 errors are a function of 21n  and 12n . We use the following 
measures of misclassification [Schneidewind, 1994], [El-Emam, 1999c]. 
The Type 1 misclassification rate is1 f− , and the Type 2 misclassification rate is 
1 S−  [Khoshgoftaar, 1999], [Taghi, 1997]. Where f  is the specificity of the model, it is 
the proportion of low risk components that have been correctly classified as low risk 






=                                                                             8.3 
Also, S  is the sensitivity of the model, and is the proportion of high risk 
components that have been correctly classified as high risk components [Briand, 1993a], 






=                                                                                  8.4 
Some authors, such as [El-Emam, 2000] report the sensitivity and specificity 
values directly as measures. Ideally, both the sensitivity and specificity should be high. A 
low specificity means that there are many low risk components that are classified as high 
risk. Therefore, the organization would be wasting resources reinspecting or focusing 
additional testing effort on these components. A low sensitivity means that there are 
many high risk components that are classified as low risk. Therefore, the organization 
would be passing high risk components to subsequent phases. In both cases the 






8.2.5 Quality achieved 
We are interested in measuring how effective the model is in terms of the quality 
achieved after the components classified as high risk have undergone an extra verification 
activity. If all the high risk components are properly classified, all mitigation actions will 
take place by extra verification, and perfect quality will be achieved. However, quality 
will be degraded with each high risk component that is not identified. We could measure 
the criterion of achieved quality using the COmpleteness (CO) measure [Briand, 1993] 
which is the percentage of high risk components that have been actually classified as such 





=                                                                                       (5) 
Based on the time frame available and also the availability of data we will use the 
simulation model to evaluate the proposed model. We will compare the results which the 
proposed model predicts with the results of the simulation of the Pace maker case study. 
Finally we will use the simulation model results to validate the proposed model. 
8.3 Pacemaker case study 
To evaluate our proposed risk model, the proposed evaluation criteria are applied 
on the results for system level component and connector risk factors. 
8.3.1 Confusion matrix for components  
Table 8-2 shows the confusion matrix representing results from system level 
component risk factor. The predicted risk in the columns represents the result from the 
proposed model.  The Real risk in the rows represents the simulation model results. The 
value 3 corresponding to the “Low” row and “Low” column (cell n11) shows that three 
components that were predicted to be low risk components by our methodology prove to 
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be low risk components in the simulation results as well. Similarly the value in cell n22 
corresponding to the “High” row and “High” column shows that two components that 
were predicted to be high risk by our proposed methodology prove to be high risk 

















Table 8-2 the confusion matrix for the results System Level Component Risk Factor  
 
Proportion Correct 
The following calculation shows the proportion of correct predictions obtained 
from our methodology when compared to the simulation results. The result is 1, which 
means that our methodology predicted results are 100% identical to the simulation model 
results for the pace maker case study. The result might not be this accurate for other case 




=   =  5/5 = 1 
Misclassification rate 
The following shows the calculation of the misclassification rate. There are 0 






=   =  3/(3+0) =1 
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The Type 1 misclassification rate is 1 f−     =  1-1  =  0 






=   = 2/(0+2) = 1 
Quality achieved 





=   =  2/2 = 1 
8.3.2 Confusion matrix for connectors 
The confusion matrix for system level connector risk factors is shown in Table 8-
3. The cell n12 shows that two connectors that were predicted as high risk were actually 
low risk connectors from the simulation results. Similarly, the cell N21 shows that one 
connector that was predicted as high risk by our methodology was actually a low risk 

















Table 8-3 Confusion matrix for connectors  
 
The proportion of correct predictions and the misclassifications are calculated 
















=   =  4/(4+2) =0.667 
The Type 1 misclassification rate 
1 f−     =  1-1  =  0.333 
 












=   = 1/2 = 0.5 
The model does not work well for the prediction of connector risk, and quality 
achieved, while Type 2 misclassification rate is poor. 
8.4 Validation by comparing the simulation and predicted results 
Table 8-4 shows the comparison between the predicted system level risk factors 
for the software components of Pace maker example, obtained from our proposed 
methodology and the results from the simulation model published by Yacoub et al 
[Yacoub, 2002]. The comparison is graphically represented in Figure 8.1. The results 
strongly correlate with each other and the correlation factor is 0.997.  
Component RS CD CG AR VT 
Simulation Model Result 0.0005 0.00325 0.0025 0.95 0.91485
Proposed model Result 0.002 0.002375 0.0034 0.95 0.817
     
  
Correlation 
0.99735215    

























Figure 8.1 System Level Component Risk Factor  
 
8.4.1 System Level Connector Risk Factor 
Table 8-5 shows the comparison of predicted software connector risk factors at 
system level with the simulation model results by Yacoub et al [Yacoub 2002] for Pace 
maker case study. The comparison is graphically represented in Figure 8.2. These results 
show a low correlation. The correlation factor is 0.379. The simulation model considers 
the heart and the programmer as components, whereas in our proposed methodology, 
these entities are considered as external actors. Therefore, the connectors that involve the 
heart or the programmer are not considered in our case and hence could not be compared 
with the simulation results. This could be an apparent reason for the low correlation. 
Connector RS-CD RS-CG CD-CG CG-CD CG-ARCG-VTAR-VTVT-AR
Simulation Model Result 0.00035 0.00035 0.00075 0.0005 0.0007 0.0007 0.2375 0.2565
Proposed model Result 0.0008930.000893 0.0026750.002675 0.5 0.5 0.0763 0.708
        
   
Correlation
0.378665      






















Figure 8.2 System Level Connector Risk Factor 
 
8.4.2 Scenario Level component risk factor 
Tables 8-6 to 8-11 show the comparison of our results with the simulation model 
results for scenario level component risk factor for each scenario in the Pace maker case 
study. Figure 8.3 to Figure 8.9 graphically represent these results. The results have a high 
correlation factor. The correlation values are given in the corresponding tables. 
Programming scenario  
Component RS CD CG ARVT
Simulation Model Result0.02075 0.1685 0.1215 0 0
Proposed model Result 0.05 0.125 0.15 0 0
     
  
Correlation 
0.925109675   
























Figure 8.3 Programming scenario Components Risk Factor 
 
AVI Scenario 
Component RSCD CG AR VT 
Simulation Model Result 0 0 0 0.5054 0.4446 
Proposed model Result 0 0 0.000160.300680.33095
     
  
Correlation
0.98138     
Table 8-7 AVI scenario Components Risk Factor 
 




















Figure 8.4 AVI scenario Components Risk Factor 
 
AAI scenario 
Component RSCD CG AR VT
Simulation Model Result 0 0 0 0.95 0
Proposed model Result 0 0 0.000450.94905 0
     
  
Correlation
1    





















Figure 8.5 AAI  scenario Components Risk Factor 
 
VVI scenario component risk factor 
 
Component RSCDCG ARVT 
Simulation Model Result 0 0 0 0 0.95
Proposed model Result 0 0 0.00045 00.94905
     
   
Correlation
1   
Table 8-9 VVI scenario Components Risk Factor 


















Figure 8.6 VVI  scenario Components Risk Factor 
VVT scenario 
 
Component RSCD CG ARVT 
Simulation Model Result 0 0 0 0 0.95
Proposed model Result 0 0 0.00025 00.949
     
  
Corrilation 
0.999999974   























Figure 8.7 VVT scenario Components Risk Factor 
 
AAT Scenario 
Component RSCDCG AR VT
Simulation Model Result 0 0 0 0.95 0
Proposed model Result 0 0 0.00025 0.949 0
     
   
Correlation
1   
Table 8-11 AAT scenario Components Risk Factor 
 


















Figure 8.8 AAT Scenario Components Risk Factor 
 
8.5 Severity methodology validation. 
To validate this methodology we run fault injection experiment [Abdelmoez, 2004]. 
Fault injection experiment explores the behavior of the system in a case of failure 
resulting from an injected fault based on fault model.  
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The experiment shows that some failures in components/connectors considered in 
the domain expert fault tree are unrealistic. On the other hand, other unaccounted failures  
can be discovered in the experiment. Based on the results of the experment we can 
validate the proposed severity methodology. 
We used a CCS case study (chapter 7) to apply the methodology and running 
experiment. We used the results estimated from the methodology (chapter 5) and from 
the experiment [Abdelmoez, 2004] with the previous validation criteria to validate the 
proposed severity methodology. We found some components/connectors considered to be 
contributing to certain failures by domain expert turned out not to have any role. 
Furthermore, Fault injection can discover some failures in components/ connectors that 
could not be discovered by the domain expert analysis. 
8.5.1 Fault injection analysis 
This step has been presented here for the sake of completeness and the detailed implementation is 
presented in [Abdelmoez, 2004]. 
In order to verify and validate the functionality of the command and control system, 
we use the environment, which consists of the system, the Fault-Generator and the 
Observer [Abdelmoez, 2004]. We put the system under investigation while faults being 
injected by using the Fault Generator (and the consequences are monitored through the 
Observer). The simulation is exercising all recoverable faults that the system can go 
through and react in the way specified in the requirements. We apply that fault injection 
methodology using Rose Real Time [Gomaa, 2000] simulation environment and log 
component states in order to observe the system response to the injected fault. Based on 
the consequences of resulting changes in component states on the system mission, we 
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analysis the log of the simulation to establish the fault tree for every 
component/connector with failures associated with the injected fault. 
This analysis is being conducted for the system components and using various types 
faults according to the proposed fault model.  
 / v a lve 2 R 1
 : Va lve 2
 / v a lve 1 R 1
 : Va lve 1
 / co m m a n d _ a n d _ co n tro lR 1
 : C o m m a n d _ a n d _ co n tro l
 / p u m p 2 R 1
 : P u m p 2
 / p u m p 1 R 1
 : Pu mp 1
 / o p e ra to rR 1
 : O p e ra to r
1 :  M o d e  S e t t i n g  C o m m a n d  (M o d e )
1 .1 :  S ta rt  U p
1 .2 :  A rm  M o to r (In i t .  S p e e d  )
1 .3 :  S ta rt  U p
1 .4 : A rm  M ot or (  In i t .  Sp e e d  )
1 .1 .1 :  S p e e d  F e e d b a c k ( S p e e d  )
1 .5 :  O p e n
1 .3 .1 : S pe e d  F e ed b a ck  ( S p ee d  )
1 .6 : O p e n
1 .5 .1 :  V a l v e  O pe n
1 .7 :  A rm  M o to r ( F i n a l  S p e e d )
1 .6 .1 :  V a l v e  O pe n
1 .8 : A rm  M ot or ( Fi na l  S p ee d )
1 .7 .1 :  S p e e d  F e e d b a c k (S p e e d  )
1 .8 .1 : S pe e d  F e ed b a ck  ( S p ee d  )
1 .9 :  C l e a r In h i b i t
1 .1 0 :  C l e a r In h i b i t
 
Figure 8.9 “Mode setting” system sequence 
diagram 
 
Our objective is to come up with a study of the effects of failures on a component-
by-component and a connector-by-connector basis. We inject faults (one at a time) into 
components and we run the simulator to study effects of a failure. Similarly, we inject 
faults (one at a time) into connectors and run the simulator to study the effects of a 
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failure. Figure 8.10 shows the fault tree of the external event “Mode setting” (Figure 8.9) 
which is a result of the step 3 of the proposed methodology. During this scenario (Figure 
8.10) components (C1 to C10) interact to achieve the mode setting action. If we injected 
fault to that event (“Mode Setting”) it will lead to system failure. This failure of the 
system mission could happen if the system received “Mode setting” in error. The 
resulting fault tree after injected fault is shown in Figure 4 without doted lines. 

































Figure 8.10 “Mode Setting” Command” event fault 
tree 
As described above Figure 8.10 shows the fault tree resulting from the analysis 
(chapter 5 methodology step 3). The dotted lines are the branches of the tree for failures 
that the fault injection experiment showed to be unrealistic. Comparing the severity 
estimated based on the two fault tree structures, we could validate the severity assessment 
methodology as discussed in the following section. 
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8.5.2 Severity Methodology Validation 
The fault tree output is used to estimate the cost of failure of any component or 
connector. We assume for every scenario that failure of any component or connector 
could lead to the failure of the system. By injecting fault and running the experiment we 
could estimate the exact contribution of components or connectors in the system failure 
during the execution of a specific scenario by means of exact fault tree (Figure 8.10 
without doted lines). This will lead to a fault tree different from the one estimated from 
step 3 of the methodology (Figure 4) for every component/connector. This leads to 
different cost of failure than the one estimated from step 4 of the methodology. To 
evaluate the proposed severity methodology we use the previous criteria. In our 
validation process we assume that two variables, real severity (estimated based on the 
simulation model) and predicted severity (estimated from the proposed methodology), for 















Table 8-12 The confusion matrix for components of the CCS case study. 
 
The proportion of correct predictions and the misclassifications are calculated as 















=   =  16/(16+1) =0.94 
The Type 1 misclassification rate is  
 
1 f−     =  1-0.94  =  0.06 
 







=   = 18/(0+18) = 1 
Type 2 misclassification rate = 1 S− = 1-1 = 0 
 
The model works well for the prediction of catastrophic severity, and also for 
critical severity prediction, the model predict all the catastrophic severity but it predicts 
critical severity components by error factor 0.06 which is not bad. 
8.6 Conclusion  
As shown in this chapter we compared the result from the proposed methodology 
with the simulation results [Yacoub, 2003]. We conclude that the result of the proposed 
methodology gives high correlation for the component risk factor (scenario level or 
system level). The risk factor of connectors (scenario and system level) gives poor 
correlation. 
After that we used three measures to evaluate the proposed risk technique. These 
measures are based on confusion matrix [Briand, 2000]. The risk model is considered as a 
good predictor for components risk factor but still need many case studies to draw a final 
conclusion. It is not considered to be a good predictor for a connector’s risk factor and it 
needs many case studies before a final conclusion can be drawn. 
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C h a p t e r  9  





There is an increasing need for a tool that can be used to track the quality of a 
software product during the software design phase.  
The product of the software development phases should be measurable in order to 
find and control its errors. Unfortunately, quality assurance methods with extensive 
automated support only apply in phases that are too late in the software life cycle to be 
really cost-effective. Many important product quality characteristics, such as 
performance, maintainability and risk assessment cannot be added late in the lifecycle, 
hence early warnings of poor quality expectation would be very useful to allow for early 
corrective measures. To automate and implement the proposed risk assessment 
methodology (chapter 6) we propose a prototype tool. We proceed in this chapter as 
follows: 
Section 9.1 is the introduction; Section 9.2 presents a review, sections 9.3 and 9.4 
present the proposed tool and its use case diagram, and finally, Section 9.5 is the 
conclusion and future work. 
9.2 Review 
Current research and development mostly goes in the direction of building tools to 
automate the software measurement process. Several tools of this type already exist.  
For example, Lorenz and Kidd introduce a tool called OOMetric, which 
developed as software measurements tool for Smalltalk and VisualAge programs. The 
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basis for this tool can be found in [Lorenz, 1994]. Lorenz and Kidd describe 
measurements and give advice derived from a number of actual projects that have used 
object technology to deliver products. Reiner Dumke and his team [Dumke, 1996] 
developed a tool called ObjecTool, which is used for analyzing C++ programs. 
Fenelon et al [Fenelon, 1999] have developed a tool support for the estimation of 
software quality. El-Emam [El-Emam, 2001c], presents a metrics analyzer tool for the 
C++ source code. This analyzer collects its data from C++ code. These data are analyzed 
to calculate a set of design metrics. In [Nenonen, 2000], the author presented a tool for 
measuring static metrics from UML diagrams. These mentioned tools are highly 
specialized in the approaches they implement and the particular phase of the software life 
cycle in which they are applicable.  
Many of these tools are source code metrics based decision making tools 
(language oriented tools). None of the mentioned tools deled with any kind of dynamic 
metrics of the software. 
Source code metrics are affected by the programming style of the programmer. Th 
programming language itself with its structures affects the metrics results. When 
calculating the metrics from architectural descriptions like UML, we achieve 
independence of languages and human factors [Hitz, 1998]. 
On the other hand, some tools [Nenonen, 2000] do get a description from 
intermediate file by using certain CASE tools; they can be used in the design phase as 
well, but they only produce static metrics to describe the model with limited capability, 
which is not enough to accurately represent the dynamic behavior of the architecture. 
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They even require the software model to be in a specific chosen format, which is not 
convenient for popular use.  
Our proposed tool is a dynamic metrics based tool, UML based tool, and used 
early on in the design phase for the prediction of software architectural element risk. 
9.3 Proposed Tool 
 The implementation and the coding of the tool is presented in details in [Wang, 
2003]. 
To obtain useful quality assurance information early enough for improvement 
purposes, we base our quality predictions on measurements and calculations of the high-
level design diagrams obtained from UML artifacts. To automate and implement the risk 
assessment methodology we propose an automated UML-based software risk assessment 
prototype tool.  
The proposed prototype tool is called Architecture-level Risk Assessment Tool 
(ARAT), and is used to demonstrate the process of risk assessment. ARAT is built to 
implement the risk assessment methodology (presented in chapter 6), by manipulating the 
data acquired from domain expert and measures obtained from UML artifacts. 
ARAT measures dynamic metrics proposed in [Hassan, 2001] (chapter 4) and 
automatically analyzes the quality of the architecture to produce architectural level 






Figure 9.1 Overall architecture of ARAT 
Rational Rose is a well established UML modeling tool in software engineering 
[Douglass, 2000] To model the software under study we used Rose RT as a modeling 
environment. RRT is specifically useful for modeling real time system [ ].  
To be able to quantify measurements from the visual UML model, we used RRT 
script to convert the UML visual model to readable text format. The script automatically 
goes through all the diagrams of the target software UML model. It captures the detailed 
information of the visual UML model and stores it in the repository for further analysis 
and calculation. 
On the top of these information of UML model we use java as a programming 
environment with the proposed risk methodology [Katerina, 2003] and severity analysis 
process [Hassan, 2003c] to come up with detailed risk assessment of the software model. 
For historical review and comparing multiple versions of the design we store all the 
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information of the model and the results of risk assessment process on a repository as 
shown in figure 9.1. 
9.3.1 ARAT Use Case 
In this section we will describe the use case diagram of ARAT, which is shown in 




Figure 9.2 ARAT Use Case diagram 
 
Collection model information (use case 1) 
 
The implementation of this part of the tool is done using the RRT script with the 
UML model under RRT environment. The input of this module is the UML visual model 
and the output is the detailed information of the UML model as a text format. Figure 9.3 






Figure 9.3 Information captured from use case diagram pacemaker 
 
Retrieve model information (use case 2) 
This use case is used for input/output the information to/from the repository. This 
information could be about the UML model, dynamic metrics, severity, or risk 
assessment. 
Estimate dynamic metrics (use case 3) 
This part of the tool is the implementation of dynamic metrics presented in 
chapter 4. Figure 9.4 shows example of coupling for connectors for pace maker case 
study. 
Estimate Component/Connector risk factor (use case 4) 
This part of the tool used with input from severity assessment (chapter 5), and 





Figure 9.4 connector coupling for every scenario of pacemaker 
Estimate scenario level risk actor (use case 5) 
To implement the estimation of scenario level risk factor we use this part of the 
tool. The estimation of scenario level risk factor is shown in chapter 6. The detailed 
analysis of the scenario level risk factor is presented in [Ajith, 2004] 
Estimate system level risk factor (use case 6) 
This part of the tool is the implementation of system level risk factor described in 
chapter 6. The detailed description and design of ARAT is presented in [Wang, 2003].  




Figure 9.5 is one of the examples of console GUI from the ARAT 
 
9.4 Conclusion 
Our proposed architectural risk assessment tool is designed to be utilized during 
the early software development phases. We use Rational Rose Real Time (RRT) as a 
modeling environment [Rose, 2001] We use Rose Script for collecting the UML model 
information from the UML visual model. This tool support of the risk assessment 
methodology could help software managers and engineers to control and optimize the 
software development process.  
The main benefit of the proposed tool is that it enables the automation of early 
assessment of system risk at the architectural level and hence makes it possible for the 
analyst to identify critical components and connectors early in the software lifecycle. 
In summary, the main objectives of this tool are listed below: 
1. ARAT could carry on the risk assessment as early as the design phase in the 
lifecycle of the software development. 
2. By using ARART, we would be able to precisely compute the 




3. the manager will be able to determine the distribution of the scenario, use case 
or system risk factor over different severity classes. 
4. With ARAT, the analyst will be able to identify critical components based on 
the risk estimation. 
5. ARAT is flexible enough to include more functional modules that will be 
developed in the future, like performance analysis module, hazard analysis 
module etc. 
In the future, we intend to integrate severity assessment module to ARAT to 
automate the severity analysis methodology proposed in chapter 5. 
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C h a p t e r  1 0  





Several conclusions emerge from this research. We conclude that this work is a 
promising and significant step in meeting our research objectives: to develop risk 
assessment methodology based on measurable parameters that could be automatically 
collected and analyzed in the early software design phase based on UML artifacts. And to 
develop a severity assessment methodology based on UML artifacts. Several other 
conclusions are drawn with respect to our aims of the research.  
This research presents the architectural-level reliability-based risk assessment 
methodology. In this research we propose a methodology for risk assessment based on 
the UML specifications such as use cases and sequence diagrams that can be used in the 
early phases of software life cycle. The proposed methodology uses dynamic complexity 
and dynamic coupling metrics that are obtained from the UML specifications [Hassan, 
2001].  
The risk assessment methodology presented in this research [Katerina, 2003] 
considers both component and connector risk factors. It is used for calculating the risk 
factors of various components and connectors and estimating a risk factor of scenarios 
use cases and system level. We combine the probability of software architectural element 




To estimate the probability of software architectural element failure we propose 
dynamic metrics (dynamic complexity/dynamic coupling) for the software architectural 
element. The proposed metrics could be obtained at early development phases from UML 
models.  
To estimate the severity of software failure we propose a UML based severity 
methodology (chapter 5). This methodology describes a process for estimating severity of 
each software architectural element component/connector at the software architectural 
level as well as severity of system scenarios [Hassan, 2003]. The process is based on 
dynamic UML specifications, taking into account the possibility of component/connector 
cost of failures [Hassan, 2003c]. The severity methodology is based on hazard analysis 
techniques [Hassan, 2005]. FFA is used as a top down approach based on system 
scenarios to identify the system level failures, FMEA is used as a bottom up appraoch 
based on the detailed view of the system to identify the possible causes 
component/connector failures and FTA correlates the results of FMEA and FFA.  
Since the risk assessment methodology is entirely analytical and provides a closed 
form solution, it is very suitable for automation. In fact, a prototype of the risk 
assessment tool written in JAVA [Wang, 2003] which reads the embedded UML 
information from Rational Rose visual model, and calculates the various risk factors has 
already been developed. 
In summary the proposed methodology is an efficient method to estimate risk 
factors on different levels of software design and we could estimate overall system risk 
factor. It enables us to estimate scenarios and use cases risk factors which enable us to 
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focus on the high-risk scenarios and uses cases even though they may be rarely used and 
therefore may not contribute significantly to the overall system risk factor.  
Next, we estimate the distribution of the scenarios/use cases/system risk factors over 
different severity classes, which allow us to make a list of critical scenarios in each use 
case, as well as a list of critical use cases in the system for every severity class. Finally, 
we identify a list of critical components and connectors that has high risk values in high 
severity classes. 
Our future work is focused on generalization of the methodology presented in this 
dissertation. Thus, we will extend this methodology to relax the assumption of 
independent use cases. We will consider different kinds of dependencies that might be 
present in the UML use case diagrams (i.e. considers the various relationships between 
the use cases) and the way to derive their risk factors. Another direction of our future 
research is the development of performance based risk assessment methodology 
[Cortellessa, 2005] and requirement based risk assessment methodology [Appukutty, 
2005]. 
In the future, we could also do the following:  
• Empirically validate the proposed dynamic metrics and their correlation with 
design quality attributes, 
• Develop severity assessment module to be integrated with ARAT to automate the 
severity analysis methodology proposed in chapter 5, 
• Extend the risk methodology for other kinds of risk (Ex. maintainability risk, 
performance risk, requirement risk), 
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• Validate the severity methodology using fault injection experiment using many 
case studies. 
• Apply the mitigation action required as a result of risk assessment on a specific 
case study (ex. redesign the system) and reassess the risk. 
• Extend the system to handle the risk management not only risk assessment (based 
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A-1 
A p p e n d i x  A  
Pace Maker Case Study 
 









































































































Figures 1-4 show the scenario diagrams for the pace maker case study. 
Components and connectors severities are shown in Tables 1,2. 
 
Component severity 
Scenario Name RS CD CG AR VT
Programming 0.25 0.25 0.5   
AVI   0.5 0.95 0.95
AAI   0.5 0.95  
VVI   0.5  0.95
AAT   0.5 0.95  
VVT   0.5  0.95
 






Scenario name   
Programming AVI AAI VVI AAT VVT 
RS-CD 0.25           
RS-CG 0.25           
CD-CG 0.25           
CG-CD 0.25           
CG-AR   0.5 0.5   0.5   
CG-VT   0.5   0.5   0.5 









AR-VT   0.95         
 
Table 2 connectors severity for every scenario of the Pace maker 
 
Figure 5 shows the risk factor for each component for each scenario of the 






Figure 5 the tool demo output for risk of pace maker scenarios 
 










A p p e n d i x  B  
HCS Case study Results 
 
According to the expert domain knowledge the probabilities of use case operation 
is as follow. 
Use case S_LT D_LT MT S_MT D_MT R_B_P Dua LT Monitor 
Probability 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.92 
Table (1) shows the probabilities of the scenarios of the HCS 
 
Tables 2-9 show the complexity, severity and risk factor of every component for every 
scenario. 
scenario component complexity severity Risk Factor 
pFMC_MTR1 0.071428575 0.25 0.017857 
pFMC_LTR1 0.14285715 0.75 0.107143 
n3_2_Data_AccessR1 0.071428575 0.25 0.017857 
appl_command_queueR1 0.071428575 0.75 0.053571 
fRITCSR1 0.071428575 0.5 0.035714 
sCITCSR1 0.37714287 0.95 0.358286 
schedularR1 0.14285715 0.5 0.071429 
S_LT 
n3_1_Data_AccessR1 0.071428575 0.75 0.053571 
Table (2) S_LT Scenario components risk factor 
 
scenario component complexity severity Risk Factor 
pFMC_LTR1 0.071428575 0.25 0.017857 
n3_1_Data_AccessR1 0.071428575 0.25 0.017857 
pFMC_MTR1 0.14285715 0.75 0.107143 
schedularR1 0.14285715 0.5 0.071429 
sCITCSR1 0.35714287 0.95 0.339286 
fRITCSR1 0.071428575 0.5 0.035714 
n3_2_Data_AccessR1 0.071428575 0.75 0.053571 
S_MT 
appl_command_queueR1 0.071428575 0.75 0.053571 
Table (3) S_MT scenario components complexity, severity and risk factor 
 
scenario component complexity severity Risk Factor
sCITCSR1 0.2857143 0.95 0.27142859
fRITCSR1 0.35714287 0.95 0.33928573
rPCM_LT 0.071428575 0.95 0.067857146
pFMC_LTR1 0.071428575 0.95 0.067857146
rPCM_MT 0.14285715 0.95 0.13571429
R_B_P 
pFMC_MTR1 0.071428575 0.95 0.067857146





scenario component complexity severity Risk Factor 
n3_1_Data_AccessR1 0.18181819 0.95 0.172727 
sCITCSR1 0.27272728 0.5 0.136364 
pFMC_LTR1 0.09090909 0.75 0.068182 
rPCM_LT 0.18181819 0.5 0.090909 
fRITCSR1 0.27272728 0.95 0.259091 
appl_command_queueR1 0 0 0 
LT 
schedularR1 0 0 0 
Table (5) LT Scenario components risk factor 
 
 
scenario component complexity severity Risk Factor 
pFMC_MTR1 0.13333334 0.75 0.1 
pFMC_LTR1 0.06666667 0.25 0.016667 
fRITCSR1 0.06666667 0.5 0.033333 
n3_2_Data_AccessR1 0.06666667 0.75 0.05 
sCITCSR1 0.4 0.95 0.38 
schedularR1 0.13333334 0.5 0.066667 
n3_1_Data_AccessR1 0.06666667 0.25 0.016667 
D_LT 
appl_command_queueR1 0.06666667 0.75 0.05 
Table (6) D_LT Scenario components risk factor 
 
scenario component complexity severity Risk Factor 
n3_1_Data_AccessR1 0.06666667 0.75 0.05 
appl_command_queueR1 0.06666667 0.75 0.05 
fRITCSR1 0.06666667 0.5 0.033333 
pFMC_MTR1 0.06666667 0.25 0.016667 
sCITCSR1 0.4 0.95 0.38 
schedularR1 0.13333333 0.5 0.066667 
pFMC_LTR1 0.13333333 0.75 0.1 
D_MT 
n3_2_Data_AccessR1 0.06666667 0.25 0.016667 




scenario component complexity severity Risk Factor
fRITCSR1 0.27272728 0.95 0.259091
sCITCSR1 0.27272728 0.5 0.136364
pFMC_MTR1 0.09090909 0.75 0.068182
n3_2_Data_AccessR1 0.18181819 0.95 0.172727
MT 
rPC_MT 0.18181819 0.5 0.090909





Figure 1 D_MT scenario 
 
scenario component complexity severity Risk Factor 
sCITCSR1 0.25 0.25 0.0625 
appl_command_queueR1 0.25 0.95 0.2375 
schedularR1 0.25 0.95 0.2375 
Monitor 
fRITCSR1 0.25 0.95 0.2375 








Figure 2 Components risk factor for every scenario 
 
Figure 9 shows the 3-D bar graph for risk factor for all components for every 
scenario. The components “sCITCSR1” and “fRITCSR1” have high risk in more that one 
scenario.  
Connector risk factor for every scenario HCS 
Tables 10-18 show the connectors coupling, severity and risk factor for every 
scenario. 
scenario sender receiver coupling severity Risk Factor
appl_command_queueR1 sCITCSR1 0.05882353 0.5 0.029411765
sCITCSR1 appl_command_queueR1 0.05882353 0.75 0.04411765
sCITCSR1 pFMC_LTR1 0.05882353 0.95 0.055882353
sCITCSR1 pFMC_MTR1 0.1764706 0.75 0.13235295
pFMC_LTR1 sCITCSR1 0.05882353 0.95 0.055882353
sCITCSR1 n3_2_Data_AccessR1 0.1764706 0.75 0.13235295
sCITCSR1 fRITCSR1 0.05882353 0.75 0.04411765
sCITCSR1 n3_1_Data_AccessR1 0.11764706 0.75 0.0882353
pFMC_MTR1 sCITCSR1 0.11764706 0.75 0.0882353
n3_1_Data_AccessR1 sCITCSR1 0.05882353 0.75 0.04411765
S_MT 
schedularR1 sCITCSR1 0.05882353 0.95 0.055882353







scenario sender receiver Coupling severity Risk Factor
schedularR1 sCITCSR1 0.05882353 0.75 0.04411765
sCITCSR1 fRITCSR1 0.05882353 0.95 0.055882353
sCITCSR1 appl_command_queueR1 0.05882353 0.5 0.029411765
n3_2_Data_AccessR1 sCITCSR1 0.05882353 0.95 0.055882353
sCITCSR1 pFMC_MTR1 0.05882353 0.95 0.055882353
sCITCSR1 n3_1_Data_AccessR1 0.1764706 0.95 0.16764706
appl_command_queueR1 sCITCSR1 0.05882353 0.75 0.04411765
sCITCSR1 pFMC_LTR1 0.1764706 0.95 0.16764706
pFMC_LTR1 sCITCSR1 0.11764706 0.75 0.0882353
sCITCSR1 n3_2_Data_AccessR1 0.11764706 0.95 0.11176471
S_LT 
pFMC_MTR1 sCITCSR1 0.05882353 0.75 0.04411765
Table (11) S_LT scenario 
scenario sender receiver Coupling severity Risk Factor 
sCITCSR1 pFMC_MTR1 0.15 0.95 0.1425 
sCITCSR1 n3_2_Data_AccessR1 0.1 0.75 0.075 
sCITCSR1 n3_1_Data_AccessR1 0.1 0.75 0.075 
n3_1_Data_AccessR1 sCITCSR1 0.05 0.95 0.0475 
pFMC_MTR1 sCITCSR1 0.1 0.75 0.075 
schedularR1 sCITCSR1 0.05 0.75 0.0375 
sCITCSR1 pFMC_LTR1 0.15 0.75 0.112500004 
sCITCSR1 fRITCSR1 0.05 0.5 0.025 
pFMC_LTR1 sCITCSR1 0.1 0.95 0.095 
sCITCSR1 appl_command_queueR1 0.05 0.75 0.0375 
n3_2_Data_AccessR1 sCITCSR1 0.05 0.95 0.0475 
Dua 
appl_command_queueR1 sCITCSR1 0.05 0.75 0.0375 
Table (12) Dua scenario 
scenario sender receiver Coupling severity Risk Factor
schedularR1 sCITCSR1 0.0625 0.75 0.046875
sCITCSR1 fRITCSR1 0.0625 0.75 0.046875
sCITCSR1 appl_command_queueR1 0.0625 0.75 0.046875
pFMC_MTR1 sCITCSR1 0.125 0.75 0.09375
sCITCSR1 pFMC_LTR1 0.0625 0.75 0.046875
sCITCSR1 n3_2_Data_AccessR1 0.125 0.95 0.11875
sCITCSR1 n3_1_Data_AccessR1 0.125 0.95 0.11875
appl_command_queueR1 sCITCSR1 0.0625 0.95 0.059375
pFMC_LTR1 sCITCSR1 0.0625 0.75 0.046875
sCITCSR1 pFMC_MTR1 0.1875 0.75 0.140625
D_LT 
n3_1_Data_AccessR1 sCITCSR1 0.0625 0.75 0.046875
Table (13) D_LT scenario 
scenario sender receiver Coupling severity Risk Factor 
schedularR1 sCITCSR1 0.33333334 0.75 0.25 
sCITCSR1 fRITCSR1 0.33333334 0.95 0.31666666 
Monitor 
sCITCSR1 appl_command_queueR1 0.33333334 0.75 0.25 






scenario sender receiver Coupling severity Risk Factor 
fRITCSR1 sCITCSR1 0.3 0.95 0.285 
n3_1_Data_AccessR1 fRITCSR1 0.1 0.75 0.075 
fRITCSR1 pFMC_LTR1 0.1 0.75 0.075 
pFMC_LTR1 fRITCSR1 0.3 0.75 0.22500001 
LT 
fRITCSR1 rPCM_LT 0.2 0.75 0.15 
Table (15) LT scenario 
 
scenario sender receiver Coupling severity Risk Factor 
fRITCSR1 sCITCSR1 0.3 0.75 0.22500001 
fRITCSR1 pFMC_MTR1 0.1 0.75 0.075 
n3_2_Data_AccessR1 fRITCSR1 0.1 0.95 0.095 
pFMC_MTR1 fRITCSR1 0.3 0.95 0.285 
MT 
fRITCSR1 rPC_MT 0.2 0.75 0.15 
Table (16) MT scenario 
 
scenario sender receiver Coupling severity Risk Factor 
pFMC_LTR1 fRITCSR1 0.2 0.5 0.1 
fRITCSR1 pFMC_LTR1 0.06666667 0.95 0.06333333 
fRITCSR1 pFMC_MTR1 0.06666667 0.75 0.050000004 
pFMC_MTR1 fRITCSR1 0.2 0.95 0.19 
fRITCSR1 sCITCSR1 0.26666668 0.75 0.20000002 
fRITCSR1 rPCM_LT 0.06666667 0.75 0.050000004 
R_B_P 
fRITCSR1 rPCM_MT 0.13333334 0.75 0.10000001 
Table (17) R_B_P scenario 
 
scenario sender receiver Coupling severity Risk Factor
sCITCSR1 pFMC_LTR1 0.1875 0.75 0.140625
schedularR1 sCITCSR1 0.0625 0.95 0.059375
sCITCSR1 n3_1_Data_AccessR1 0.125 0.75 0.09375
appl_command_queueR1 sCITCSR1 0.0625 0.95 0.059375
sCITCSR1 pFMC_MTR1 0.0625 0.75 0.046875
n3_2_Data_AccessR1 sCITCSR1 0.0625 0.75 0.046875
sCITCSR1 appl_command_queueR1 0.0625 0.75 0.046875
sCITCSR1 fRITCSR1 0.0625 0.75 0.046875
pFMC_LTR1 sCITCSR1 0.125 0.75 0.09375
sCITCSR1 n3_2_Data_AccessR1 0.125 0.75 0.09375
D_MT 
pFMC_MTR1 sCITCSR1 0.0625 0.75 0.046875
Table (18) D_MT scenario 
 
Applying the severity methodology presented in chapter 5 to this case study we 
estimate the severity of every component and connector for every scenario as shown in 




Scenario name  
S_LT D_LT MT LT S_MT D_MT Dua Monitor R_B_P 
pMR1 0.25 0.75 0.75 0 0.75 0.25 0.75 0 0.95 
pLR1 0.75 0.25 0 0.75 00.25 0.75 0.75 0 0.95 
n2R1 0.25 0.75 0.95 0 0.75 0.25 0.5 0 0 
aR1 0.75 0.75 0 0 0.75 0.75 0.95 0.95 0 
fR1 0.5 0.5 0.95 0.95 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.95 0.95 
sR1 0.95 0.95 0.5 0.5 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.25 0.95 
SchR1 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.95 0 
n1R1 0.75 0.25 0 0.95 0.25 0.75 0.75 0 0 









rMT 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.95 
Table (19) Component severity for every scenario 
 
Scenario name  
S_LT D_LT MT LT S_MT D_MT Dua Monitor R_B_P 
pMR1-sR1 0.75 0.75 0 0 0.75 0.75 0.75 0 0 
pLR1-sR1 0.75 0.75 0 0 0.95 0.75 0.95 0 0 
n2R1-sR1 0.95 0 0 0 0 0.75 0.95 0 0 
aR1-sR1 0.75 0.95 0 0 0.5 0.95 0.75 0 0 
fR1-sR1 0 0 0.75 0.95 0 0 0 0 0.75 
sR1-aR1 0.5 0.75 0 0 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0 
SchR1-sR1 0.75 0.75 0 0 0.95 0.75 0.75 0.75 0 
n1R1-sR1 0 0.75 0 0 0.75 0 0.95 0 0 
rLT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
rMT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
sR1-pLR1 0.95 0.75 0 0 0.95 0.75 0.75 0 0 
sR1-pMR1 0.95 0.75 0 0 0.75 0.75 0.95 0 0 
sR1-n2R1 0.95 0.95 0 0 0.75 0.75 0.75 0 0 
sR1-n1R1 0.95 0.95 0 0 0.75 0.75 0.75 0 0 
sR1-fR1 0.95 0.75 0  0.75 0.75 0.5 0.95 0 
n1R1-fR1 0 0 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 
fR1-pLR1 0 0 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0.95 
pLR1-fR1 0 0 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0.5 
fR1-rLT 0 0 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0.75 
fR1-pMR1 0 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 
pMR1-fR1 0 0 0.95 0 0 0 0 0 0.95 









n2R1-fR1 0 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table (20) Connector severity for every scenario 
 
 
